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ABSTRACT 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN CONFLICT ESCALATION: 
THE CASE OF THE “ARMENIAN CONFERENCE” IN TURKEY  
 
GÖZDE BOĞA 
 
Program of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, M.A. Thesis, 2006 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik 
 
 
Key Words: media, conflict, Armenian conference 
 
In 25-27 May 2005, a conference entitled “Ottoman Armenians During the Decline of 
the Empire: Issues of Scientific Responsibility and Democracy,” referred to as the “Armenian 
conference” in this thesis, was scheduled to be held at Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey.  
There were two conflict escalation periods, in May and September 2005 about the conference.  
Such conflict escalation periods strengthen the parties’ own understanding of the issue and 
context of conflict; thus, further demarcates the adversaries by increasing the number of 
issues and parties to the conflict.   
 
The purpose of this endeavor is to question a possible link between the media rhetoric 
and newspapers’ ideological positioning in Turkey in a conflict escalation period and to 
identify whether the media rhetoric in the Armenian conference was escalation-oriented or 
de-escalation oriented.  The main aim for such an exploration is to emphasize the role of 
media in conflict escalation processes and the need to develop a constructive conflict 
environment with conflict analysis and resolution perspective in Turkey.   
 
The results of the research suggest that in both escalation periods, escalation-oriented 
rhetoric was used more by the media.  Moreover, it was found that there is a link between the 
media rhetoric and newspapers’ ideological positioning.  Consequently, in Turkey more 
attention should be paid to the roles of media in conflict situation and most importantly new 
constructive media policies should be developed by considering the other structural factors 
that create such a media environment. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN CONFLICT ESCALATION: 
THE CASE OF THE “ARMENIAN CONFERENCE” IN TURKEY  
 
GÖZDE BOĞA 
 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Programı, Yüksek Lisans Tezi  2006 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik 
 
 
Key Words: medya, uyuşmazlık, Ermeni konferansı 
 
25-27 Mayıs 2005’te “İmparatorluğun Çöküş Döneminde Ermeniler: Bilimsel 
Sorumluluk ve Demokrasi” başlıklı bir konferans, bu tezde “Ermeni konferansı” olarak sözü 
geçmektedir, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, İstanbul, Türkiye’de düzenlenmek istendi.  Mayıs ve 
Eylül 2005 dönemlerinde konferans ile ilgili uyuşmazlığın arttığı iki dönem oldu. Bu gibi 
uyuşmazlığın arttığı dönemler uyuşmazlık taraflarının uyuşmazlık konusuyla ve uyuşmazlığın 
bağlamı ile ilgili kendilerine ait anlayışlarını güçlendirir.  Böylece uyuşmazlık konularının ve 
taraflarının sayıca artmasına yol açarak, uyuşmazlığa konu olan partilerin sınırlarını daha 
belirgin kılar.   
 
Bu çalışmanın gayesi uyuşmazlığın arttığı bir dönemde medya retoriği ile gazetelerin 
Türkiye’deki ideolojik konumlanmaları arasında bir bağlantı olup olmadığının 
değerlendirilmesidir. Böyle bir sorgulamanın amacı medyanın uyuşmazlığın arttığı 
dönemdeki rolünü ve Türkiye’de uyuşmazlık analizi ve çözümü perspektifi ile yapıcı 
uyuşmazlık ortamı geliştirme ihtiyacını vurgulamaktır.   
 
Çalışmanın sonuçları göstermektedir ki medya uyuşmazlığın arttığı iki dönemde de 
uyuşmazlığı arttırma odaklı retorik kullanmıştır.  Bunun yanında medya retoriği ile 
gazetelerin ideolojik konumları arasında bir bağ olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.  Dolayısıyla 
Türkiye’de medyanın uyuşmazlıkta oynadığı rollerin önemi daha dikkatle incelenmeli ve en 
önemlisi bu medya ortamını ortaya çıkaran diğer yapısal faktörler de göz önüne alınarak yeni, 
yapıcı medya politikaları geliştirilmelidir.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Scope and Aim of the Study 
 
 
On 25-27 May 2005, a conference entitled “Ottoman Armenians During the 
Decline of the Empire: Issues of Scientific Responsibility and Democracy,” here after 
referred as the “Armenian conference,” was meant to be held at a public university, 
Bogazici University, in Istanbul, Turkey.  However, the conference was cancelled after 
the Minister of Justice of the time accused those associated with the conference of 
“treason” and “stabbing Turkey in the back.”  After a heavy public reaction, the Prime 
Minister of the time stepped in and said the conference should be held; thus, it was 
rescheduled for 23-25 September 2005 at Boğazici University.  But, this time, in 
response to a petition by a lawyers’ organization, on 23 September, the first day of the 
conference, the Fourth Administrative Court of Istanbul issued an order.  According to 
the Court’s order, a legal investigation about the conference’s validity would take place 
and Boğazici University could no longer play host to the conference without being held 
in contempt of the court’s ruling.  However, the organizers moved the conference to a 
second venue, private Bilgi University and squeezed their program into two days and so 
the conference was held 24-25 September 2005.  There were diverse reactions to the 
court’s order from both the public and authorities.  While the conference was being held 
at Bilgi University, outside of the conference a group of protestors from the nationalist 
Great Unity Party (BBP) and the left-nationalist Workers' Party (IP) protested, chanting 
nationalist slogans, waving flags, and throwing eggs and tomatoes at the participants.  
At the same time, some groups were defending the right to freely organize an academic 
meeting and arguing that scientific activities were being restricted1. 
 
                                                
1
 The summary of the event is written from personal knowledge developed by the information from news 
agencies, conference attendees, speeches of the organizers, and opinions of members of the society.  
 2 
In both May and September 2005 the intensity rose between different groups 
around the issue of the Armenian conference.  Accordingly, those against the conference 
had been claiming that the official discourse about the Armenian issue2 should not be 
questioned and especially not in a state university.   On the other hand, for the 
organizers of the Armenian conference, it was felt that the diversity in thinking about 
the Armenian issue would be to the benefit of Turkey because an open academic 
discussion about such a sensitive topic would be fruitful in developing a solution to the 
problem in the domestic and international arena3.   
 
However, not only the organizers and the people defending the official discourse 
around the Armenian issue were parties to the conflict.  Since the conference triggered 
an extension of a protracted conflict about the Armenian issue, tensions escalated 
between various parties.  Although, it is hard to name the dyads, the parties can be 
categorized in a broad sense.  (See Chapter Four for the discussion of the parties.)  The 
way in which the events and discussions around the Armenian conference in public 
places and in the media were articulated led to an opposition between parties defending 
the official discourse, extreme nationalists, those who had not been invited to the 
conference, those who were against the European Union versus the organizers of the 
Armenian conference, participants of the conference, those who supported the 
conference because of the fatigue of the official discourse, those  who supported the 
accession of Turkey to the European Union, and those who were against the attempts to 
suspend the conference and defending that conference issues can be discussed freely.  
Apparently, adversaries of this conflict were many in number, including official and 
non-official factions in Turkey, and the polarization of the objectives were shaped by 
being against convening of the Armenian conference and supporting the convening of 
the conference.  The arguments of these factions in Turkey were also represented in the 
public media.  
 
In this study, related to the abovementioned controversy over the Armenian 
conference, I take the May and September conflict episodes as extensions of an 
                                                
2
 While the official discourse in Turkey suggests that there was a  “so-called” Armenian genocide; some 
segments of the society, including various professionals from different fields, think that genocide happened.  
This issue is a long-lasting question in Turkey, as well as in Turkey’s relations with some European countries 
and the US. 
3
 In the international arena, parliaments of some countries accepted the existence of a genocide, such as France 
in 30 May 1998 ( Tınç, 2001), which resulted in tense relations between Turkey and France.  
 3 
intractable conflict that exists about a hotly disputed historical question of the Armenian 
plight, which has remained unresolved for a long period of time. According to Kriesberg 
“a conflict between adversaries varies in intensity over time.  Particular disputes may lie 
dormant for years, then emerge into awareness, escalate in intensity, begin to de-
escalate, and be settled or resolved, perhaps to emerge in a different form years later” 
(Kriesberg, 1982 Cf. Kriesberg and Thorson eds. 1991: 5).  Thus, the controversion of 
being against the convening of the Armenian conference and supporting the convening 
of the conference in May and September 2005 in Turkey is an escalation in the intensity 
of an intractable conflict.  
 
For the resolution of intractable conflicts, it is very important to change the 
conflicting parties’ beliefs, as well as changing the adversaries’ understanding of the 
conditions of the conflict’s context (Burton, 1990, Fisher, 1997, Kelman, 1997, 
Kriesberg, 1992).  Therefore, the rise in the intensity of a conflict as an extension of an 
intractable conflict should also be important because such a conflict escalation period 
strengthens the parties’ own understanding of the issue and context of conflict; thus, 
further demarcates the factions by increasing the number of issues and parties to the 
conflict.   
 
This study is concerned with the conflict escalation periods in May and September 
2005 regarding the Armenian conference in Turkey and it analyzes and questions the 
role of media in these conflict escalation stages.  According to Melone, Terzis and 
Beleli(2002)  simply by reporting on a conflict, the media changes the communication 
environment and as a result inherently involved in conflicts.  Therefore, not only the 
attitudes of the conflicting parties are important in the study of conflict analysis and 
resolution, but also the factors at play in the context of a conflict.  That is why the main 
objective of this study is to conduct a content analysis of five newspapers in Turkey to 
identify whether the media rhetoric in the Armenian conference was escalation-oriented 
or de-escalation oriented regarding their ideological positioning in the Turkish political 
context.  
 
Thus, this study should not be interpreted as a sociological analysis of the 
intractable conflict about the Armenian issue in Turkey, but rather as an exploratory 
study with a limited objective that aims to question if there is a link between the media 
 4 
rhetoric and newspapers’ ideological positioning in Turkey in a conflict escalation 
period. Such a study may have the potential to influence the course of conflict by 
strengthening the concept of ‘the other’ through different cognitive frames offered by 
media rhetoric. 
 
The conflict escalation stage is especially important for media because they pay 
more attention to a conflict when the scope and the intensity of conflict increases.  Not 
only the media pay more attention but also strengthen the perception of ‘the other’ in 
conflict escalation by emphasizing the polarization of the parties in conflict.  According 
to Tılıç (2001), in order to strengthen one party in a conflict, there is a need to develop a 
united identity and offer an ‘other’ as the source of danger and threat.  In the process of 
identifying ‘the other,’ according to Tılıç, the role of media to identify ‘the other’ is 
noteworthy (2001: 160).  Similarly, Kempf et.al. by referring to Tajfel and Turner’s 
social identity theory (1979, 1986) indicate that while individuals attempt to maintain 
the positive distinctiveness of his or her in-group as opposed to relevant out-groups, 
propaganda profits from this process and provides frameworks of social categories and 
offers proofs of the suitability of judging the social environment according to the given 
categories ( Kempf et. al. , 2003).  Parallel to Kempf et. al.’s arguments, this study 
argues that different media have different frameworks of social categories depending on 
their ideological positions in a related political context.  A medium’s ideological 
position is a result of the medium’s owner transferred by the journalists who offer 
frameworks of social categories by their rhetoric.  
 
Being one of the major sources of communication and information, the media 
intervene in conflict processes by offering cognitive frameworks through using various 
types of rhetoric.  In this sense, the news media may vary in selecting definitions and 
interpretations of problems in conflict processes while putting others aside.   
 
Beginning with the remarkable effect of the role of information in our social life, 
this study considers news media as a collection of communication channels that have the 
power to inform through interpreting the social dynamics of the world. Since news from 
media are the main source of information in order to perceive and interpret the dynamics 
of the socio-political environment we are in,  the manner of a medium transferring 
information must be analyzed.  As Gilboa suggests “...the mass media play a powerful 
 5 
role in creating public perceptions and portraying conflict ... in a light that may give rise 
to a ‘spiral of violence’”(Gilboa, 2002 :46).  
 
Consequently, this thesis reviews the literature on communication, media and 
conflict in order to draw a clear linkage between media rhetoric, ideological positioning 
and conflict escalation. 
 
 
1.2. Research Question 
 
 
The main research question is: “How closely tied are the newspapers’ ideologies 
to Turkey’s political space depending on their differences in patterns of escalation-
oriented rhetoric and de-escalation oriented rhetoric in the conflict escalation over 
convening the Armenian conference.”  Therefore, this study attempts to find potential 
patterns of rhetoric in different media according to their ideological positions.  That is 
why two conflict escalation episodes, in May 2005 and September 2005, are subject to 
the content analysis.  
 
However, there are some sub-questions discussed throughout the study in order to 
analyze the influence of media rhetoric.  What is the relationship between 
communication and the media in conflict processes?  How does the media intervene in a 
conflict?  What is the nature of media intervention in a conflict? 
 
 
1.2.1 Methodology 
There are two important studies that I adopted my methodology from, which 
discuss the escalation and de-escalation oriented aspects of media constructions of 
conflicts.  Wilhelm Kempf, as a professor of social psychology at the University of 
Konstanz, constructed the categorization of “escalation oriented and de-escalation 
oriented aspects of media coverage,” together with Michael Reimann and Heikki 
Luostarinen, through the basic conceptual distinction between war discourse and peace 
discourse in 1996.  In his work in 1999, Kempf analyzed the media construction of the 
 6 
Bosnian conflict, but mainly questioned the existent relationship between the newspaper 
rhetoric and reality. He found out that although the existence of great animosity with 
which the propaganda war was fought among Western journalists, the day-to-day 
coverage of the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina seems to be surprisingly little tendentious 
(Kempf, 1999).   
 
Another important study in this area is done by Ute Annabring, Burkhard Blasi & 
Jutta Möckel.  While Kempf’s study is related to the role of media in the Bosnian war 
period,  Annabring, Blasi & Möckel present the German press coverage of former 
Yugoslavia from the fall of Milosevic to identify the constructive coverage of the post-
conflict era.  (Annabring, Blasi & Möckel, 2004).  
 
Similarly, this study uses newspapers as sources of data to explore the role of 
media rhetoric through a content analysis.  The coding frame of the analysis is adopted 
from (See Appendix) the categorization of “escalation oriented and de-escalation 
oriented aspects of media coverage” by Kempf, Reimann and Luostarinan (1996, cf. 
Kempf et.al, 2003).  The main reasons to use newspapers are the difference between 
written versus oral information and the practicality.  The time and access to subjects 
necessary for recorded oral information were unavailable.  Different than Kempf et al.’s 
and Annabring, Blasi & Möckel’s studies, this work analyzes the role of media in the 
conflict escalation phase, and tries to study the link between newspapers’ ideological 
positions and their escalatory and de-escalatory rhetoric.  
 
On the other hand, although newspaper rhetoric as a whole is the main concern, 
the units of analysis of this research are the columns where opinion and interpretation of 
reality in a certain pattern can easily be identified because columnists are those who 
depend on the editorial choices of the newspaper, as well as being the closest ones to the 
owner of the medium.  Thus, the ideological positioning of newspapers is decided 
regarding the newspapers’ permanent columnists. 
 
Some might say that by depending on the columns, newspaper rhetoric as a whole 
can not be identified; however, permanent columnists are especially important to reflect 
the newspapers’ ideological positioning in the Turkish journalism context.  As Tunç 
clearly indicates, “the columnists... do not necessarily have the same opinions as their 
 7 
fellow columnists at the same newspaper, but they have to agree with the newspaper’s 
political stance.  The media owner has the last word in Turkey” (Tunç, 2003: p.4).  In 
addition, Tunç states that there are chief editors who serve as ideological gatekeepers 
(2003). Therefore, it is apparent that each newspaper, as a medium, has a leading 
political position designated by the owner through the columnists.  Similarly Tılıç 
indicates that in Turkey, internal hierarchy in a medium is so decisive that journalists 
cannot influence the decision making process and find a cooperative relation with the 
medium structure more helpful to publish the news prepared by them (Tılıç, 2001). 
 
 On the other hand, in the Turkish media context, discussing sensitive topics such 
as historical conflictual cases ranging from the role of Islam to Atatürk’s legacy, the 
military, the Armenian question, the Kurdish issue or any argument that conflicts with 
the official discourse creates internal and external problems for those newspapers (Tunç, 
2003). This means that when the issue is sensitive in a political context, distinct 
ideological positioning of media may become more apparent because external 
opposition is developed by other media to give a reply to the medium defending the 
sensitive issue or to strengthen their own ideological position.  
 
 
1.2.2 Sampling 
Newspapers are the main data sources of this research because there are two main 
assumptions grounded in the research: 
 
1 - Print media in Turkey is one of the many media capable of reflecting the 
ideological competition in Turkey by the existence of permanent columnists.  
2 - There exists a variation of newspaper rhetoric as a result of their ideological 
positioning because while interpreting the same events columnists are the ones that 
often take sides. 
 
Thus, existing variation of rhetoric must be captured to analyze their distinct 
potential to penetrate the escalation phases of conflict. 
 
 8 
There are thirty-seven newspapers in total in Turkey, five of which are going to be 
analyzed in this study.  The five newspapers are sampled according to an estimated map 
providing the nature of the ideological competitions in the Turkish political scene, 
which is adopted from Çarkoğlu and Hinich’s analysis of the emerging ideological 
space in Turkey (2005).    
 
Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2005) suggest a framework of spatial voting model by 
analyzing the emerging ideological space in Turkey.  Therefore, the spatial model 
specifies a two-dimensional ideological map to reflect the Turkish ideological 
competition.  One of the two dimensions of ideological competition in Turkey reflects 
the competition between the pro-Islamists and secularists; the latter dimension appears 
as the debate of ethnically defined nationalistic perspective; a debate over identity that 
shapes the agenda of the EU reform in the country.  Therefore, the second dimension 
can be defined as including Turkish extreme nationalists on the one hand, while 
including any ethnic minority having a historical conflict with Turkey’s official 
discourse being placed opposite of rising Turkish nationalism.  In addition, although, 
Carkoglu and Hinich (2005) suggest in their study that the spatial analysis is a tool to 
diagnose party positions and voters’ preferences of political parties in Turkey, they 
argue that their model is also convenient in reflecting the ideological structure in 
Turkey.   
 
In in this study, I used ‘the spatial map of issue dimensions in Turkish politics’ to 
estimate the theoretical ideological positions of five newspapers in Turkey in order to 
explore escalatory or de-escalatory pattern of rhetoric.  Five newspapers are chosen 
according to the varying positioning in the spatial map.  Four newspapers are chosen 
because they are the closest ones to the ends of the two dimensions and one from the 
center has been chosen as a representative of a centrist view. 
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Figure 1.1 Variation of newspapers according to their positioning in the spatial 
map of Turkish ideological competition 
 
In the ideological sample shown above, in Figure 1, Cumhuriyet (Republic) 
represents the ideology on the left, however, in the Turkish political context, “left” 
should not be taken as what western literature suggests, but having a secularist nature. 
Emphasizing Turkish national unity without emphasizing Turkish national identity as 
those at the end of Turkish nationalist dimension. Similarly, Open Source database 
defines Cumhuriyet as a Left-wing Kemalist daily that targets social-democratic 
intellectuals (https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway). 
 
Vakit (Time) represents the right because of its emphasis on practices of Islamic 
ideology and the historical roots of the Turkish population.  Vakit is defined as an 
Islamic fundamentalist daily by Open Source website.   
 
In between this spectrum, although there are many other dailies in the center; 
Hürriyet (Freedom), the oldest, having a more developed and a static ideological 
position.  Hürriyet is situated at the center-right.  It is a mass appeal daily, which has the 
country's top circulation, according to Open Source database, and is owned by Aydin 
Dogan.  
Favoring rise of different ethnic identity – 
EU supporter 
Turkish Nationalist Right- Against EU 
Secularist-Left 
Pro-Islamist Right 
Cumhuriyet 
Yeniçağ  
Agos  
Hürriyet Vakit 
Second Dimension 
First Dimension 
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Yeniçağ (New Era) is at the end of the Turkish nationalism dimension because it is 
defined as a daily reflecting the views of hard-line nationalists inside the Nationalist 
Action Party.  
 
Lastly, Agos (an irrigation trench)  is a bilingual weekly newspaper in Turkey 
published by the Armenian minority.  Therefore, Agos focuses on the need for accession 
to the EU for Turkey in order to develop European Union values such as democracy, 
human rights, and peace as well as publishing news about Armenian society in Turkey.  
Agos can easily be located at the closest to end of the EU supporters dimension when I 
rank the places of newspapers according to their ideological positions. 
 
Yeniçağ, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet are closer to the nationalist right end of the 
second dimension and often describe the opponent as the conference organizers and 
supporters.  While Vakit does not have a clear position in the Armenian conflict, Agos is 
apparently on the conference supporters’ side since the aim of the newspaper is to make 
the voice of the Armenians heard in Turkey.  
 
For this research I searched through the related newspapers’ columns from 16 
May 2005 through 5 June 2005 and 19 September through 5 October.  16 May 2005  is 
the starting date of my preliminary search because according to the information from the 
organizers, the press release about the conference was sent to the media around mid- 
May.  However, there were no columns related to the Armenian conference until 22 
May 2005.   
 
Thus the beginning date of the content analysis for the May period is 22 May 
2005. On the other hand, 3 June 2005 is the day no columns about the Armenian 
conference were represented because the intensity of conflict was lower. However, 
according to the information from the organizers, there was not a specific press release 
document in the September conference, therefore, for the September period the 
beginning of the analysis is the day that the Turkish print media first covered the 
Armenian conference and continued until the day no columns about the conference were 
present.  Thus, the content analysis is conducted in between 22 September 2005 
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through- 5 October 2005.  For practical reasons these two periods are conceptualized as 
the “May period” and “September period” in the data analysis section. 
 
 
1.2.3 Coding Procedure 
In order to explain the whole process of the coding unit and coding frame are 
explained below to give a guide to the reader of this study.  
 
 
1.2.3.1 Coding Unit 
Newspaper columns are coded through the coding units of ‘quasi-sentences’ or 
‘arguments.’ Volkens indicates that “an argument is the verbal expression of one 
political idea or issue. In its simplest form, a sentence is the basic unit of meaning. 
Therefore, punctuation can be used as a guideline for identifying arguments. The 
starting point of coding is the sentence, but what we are aiming for is an argument. In 
its shortest form, a sentence contains a subject, a verb and an attribute or an 
adjective” (Volkens, 2006).  Therefore, if a sentence contains many statements 
through the help of punctuation, the sentence is broken into different arguments. The 
arguments that fit into the coding schedule are coded; the other arguments coded as 
“0” (zero) in order to reveal the frequency of the coded arguments. 
 
 
1.2.3.2 Coding Frame 
Adopting the coding schedule developed by Kempf, Reimann and Luostarinen 
(1996 cf. Kempf et. al. 2003)4, the coding schedule is established to analyze the rhetoric 
of newspapers.  Being a simplified and modified version, after searching the literature 
on escalation and media coverage and pre-testing the coding schedule on ten articles, 
below is the coding frame to identify the escalation-oriented rhetoric and de-escalation 
oriented rhetoric of different newspapers.  There are 26 subcategories under 4 main 
categories (See, Chapter Four) for the coding frame of this study. 
 
                                                
4
 The original work of Kempf, Reimann and Luostarinen (1996) can be found in Appendix.  
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One of the reason not to use the original version of Kempf et al’s coding frame is 
that after the pretest of the coding frame on a number of column’s arguments, I found 
that some of the categories were not suitable to the nature of the conflict about the 
Armenian conference such as “a focus on violence” or “focus on victims and sacrifices 
of the population.”  The controversy over the Armenian conference was a conflict 
escalation episode but not a war.  Thus, the intensity of the words in the original 
categorization of Kempf et.al. did not meet the wording of journalists during the 
discussions over the Armenian conference.  Another reason is that two categories (social 
identification and motivational logic) in the original version were for the coding of 
various aspects about the military leaders, soldiers, victims, civil population and 
motivation about war that the nature of the Armenian conference and it is not suitable to 
code those categories because there was not any war possibility or existence of war. 
 
 
 
1.3. Design of the Study 
 
  
 Concerning the aforementioned context, the following chapter provides an 
explanation of the relationship between media and communication, the influence of the 
nature of communication in conflict, the nature of conflict processes in order to clarify 
the role of media in conflict.  The main role media carries out in a conflict situation is 
intervention.  Thus, the process of media intervention and tools for the media 
intervention are discussed in the second chapter.  As a result, the rhetoric used by media 
is taken as one of the important factors influencing the course of conflicts. 
 
 In the third chapter, the intervention time of media is analyzed in order to give 
emphasis to the importance of media intervention in conflict escalation. In this manner, 
the nature of conflict escalation is also scrutinized, and thus, the reason for scrutinizing 
the May period and September period of conflict escalation about the Armenian 
conference is discussed. 
  
The Fourth chapter reveals the findings of the content analysis. First of all, 
findings from each newspaper are analyzed in terms of frequency and intensity of the 
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categories.  Secondly,  their pattern is searched for by comparing the May and 
September period of conflict escalation.   
  
Chapter Five is the conclusion, which includes the comparison of the newspapers 
according to their ideological positions and their rhetorical patterns.  Also, the 
concluding chapter focuses on the use of this study for theory, practice and future 
research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ROLE OF MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICT 
 
 
 
 
The role of media and communication in conflict will be presented in this chapter, 
before presenting the assessment of the timing of media intervention in conflict that 
affects the conflict processes. While presenting the general picture of the firm 
relationship between media and communication and their role in conflict, the aim is to 
discuss the nature of media intervention in conflicts including the description of 
communication and conflict processes.  Subsequently, the nature of communication, 
media intervention in conflict, and cognitive frameworks as the major function of media 
intervention will be evaluated after indicating the relationship of media and 
communication.  
 
The main objectives of this chapter are to construct the general picture of the 
relation of the media and communication; describe the nature of communication that 
affects the process of conflict; to provide the groundwork that will help to determine the 
place of media intervention within conflict processes; to present an understanding of the 
operation of media and to demonstrate that the intervention of media mainly operates 
within cognitive frameworks that are being presented by different rhetoric in the media. 
 
2.1 Media and Communication 
 
Media or mass communication can be conceptualized as the channels that have 
power to collectively inform, influence, and affect societies through transference and 
assessment of the dynamics of events, thus shaping reality.  Questioning the role of 
media in conflict is crucial because, especially in the situation of conflict, 
communication plays a central role in shaping perceptions and it has a firm relationship 
with media.  The relationship between media and communication is firm because media 
is one of the massive members of innumerable communication processes with a wide 
area network.    
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Katz and Lawyer describe communication as anything that involves an exchange 
of meaning between people in which information is sent and received, so that the 
thoughts, opinions, information or feelings of each person are appropriately exchanged 
(Katz and Lawyer, 1992). In parallel with the description of Katz and Lawyer, in this 
study, communication is defined as the process of the transfer of formulated information 
from one agent to the other.  However, communication should not be understood as a 
process that occurs between individuals.  Communication should be understood as the 
collective transfer of formulated information from media agents to the society as a 
whole.  Thus, a communication process is fulfilled through information sent by the 
journalists to the society. 
The media, as the sender of information to society, use language and visuals as the 
main tools of portraying and interpreting the reality.  Katz and Lawyer determine that 
the use of language “is a way of communicating your model, or representation, of the 
world as you view it, to another” (Katz and Lawyer, 1992: 11). Therefore, it is apparent 
that media is not a monolithic structure because it is impossible to receive information 
of reality in the same manner from every media unit. That is why there are numerous 
media units, such as different TV channels, and various newspapers, that are sending the 
same information with distinct use of language. Therefore, sending information might 
be the basic act of media in communication; however, the way of using language and 
visuals might differ in sending information, which means the information sent by the 
media include diverse opinions, viewpoints and feelings. 
On the other hand, media are not only the sender of information and society is not 
only the receiver.  First of all, it should be noted that members of a certain media are 
also members of that certain society, which means media are always in interaction with 
the public.  Therefore, the information portrayed by the media is a partial or sometimes 
full representation of the public views, which connotes that the given information by the 
media also represents the information sent at first to the media by the society.  
Therefore, although the communication between media and society is not as apparent as 
a face to face communication of individuals, it is a constant process that influences 
masses.  
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2.2 Nature of Communication Process and Its Influence in Conflict 
 
In order to display a link between communication and conflict, there is a need for 
a clear understanding of the nature of communication.  In this way, the functions and 
problems of communication in conflict can be evaluated.   
 
The communication literature suggests four main paradigms of communication 
that are apparent to identify how the nature of  the communication process is effective in 
conflict processes.  Krauss and Morsella (cf. Deutsch and Coleman eds., 2000) describe 
these four paradigms to understand the relation between communication and conflict. 
 
2.2.1 Encoding-decoding paradigm 
According to Krauss and Morsella’s categorization of paradigms, the first 
category is encoding-decoding paradigm.  In the encoding-decoding paradigm, 
communication begins with an encoded message, continues with the transmission of the 
encoded message through a channel, and ends with the decoding of the receiver.  
However, in this process the message decoded by the receiver may not be the same 
message as it was in the beginning which was encoded by the sender because noises 
might distort the meaning of the message.  Noise forces the recipient to “fill in” the 
information distorted (Krauss and Morsella, cf. Deutsch and Coleman eds., 2000). 
 
Galtung and Ruge explain the existence of noise as the existence of ambiguity 
(Galtung and Ruge, 1965).  Morton Deutsch, as an example of noise, uses the Telegraph 
game to display the possible results of using third parties to transmit messages where 
misunderstanding is likely to occur because of the distorted message transmitted by 
using multiple channels rather than a direct communication (cf. Deutsch and Coleman 
eds., 2000).  Apparently, the media have the potential to distort messages during 
transmission because media are composition of multiple channels.   
 
In parallel, according to Mitchell, in conflict situations, another difficulty that 
should be considered in the relation of communication and conflict is the complexity of 
the process of signaling to multiple audiences because it is difficult to separate the 
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signals intended for different audiences (Mitchell, 1981).  Since media are addressing 
various members of a society, it is hard for the media to designate different information 
and interpretations for each individual; therefore, the intended signals sent by the media 
might be decoded by unintended audiences in numerous ways.    
 
Similarly, Galtung and Ruge suggest there is a ‘chain of news communication’ 
from the events that took place to the personal image about that event.  In the process of 
being informed about an event,  messages are exposed to distortions as the figure below 
demonstrates (Galtung and  Ruge, 1965: 65) : 
   
Figure 2.1 Chain of news communication 
 
In the first half of the chain above, the events become news with the selected 
distortion and create the media image; in the second half personal image is developed 
after receiving the media image as news; then, shaped by the personal perception.  Both 
paths of the chain are exposed to selection distortion depending on what strikes attention 
of the receivers. However, as Galtung and Ruge state that personal image about world 
events is not only shaped by the media but equally affected by the personal impressions, 
political dispatches and professional relations so on and so forth, determine the intensity 
of attention to be given to different news. 
 
The selection distortion in the chain of news communication might not always be 
a harmful factor.  However, in a situation of conflict, selected distortions have the 
potential to worsen the conflict because adversaries and the audience who have a certain 
point of view about the conflict are prone to select the information and interpretation 
that are appropriate to their own point of view, which as a result, strengthen their goals, 
behaviors and the psychological conditions that support those goals and behaviors.  
Thus, the conflict over the Armenian conference can be strengthened by the news 
communication because the anti-conference and pro-conference parties are prone to 
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select opinions similar to their own group’s interpretations and, as a result, feel 
themselves more attached to their own groups. 
 
 
2.2.2 Intentionalist paradigm 
The intentionalist paradigm emphasizes the importance of “distinction between a 
message’s literal meaning and its intended meaning.” (Krauss and Morsella cf. Deutsch 
and Coleman eds., 2000). In conflict situations, adversaries are inclined to interpret the 
meaning of the sender’s message according to their own goals and values; thus 
communication is likely to fail because conflicts are the results of incompatible 
differences in goal, value, interest and ideology (Krauss and Morsella cf. Deutsch and 
Coleman eds., 2000).  Similarly, Rubenstein suggests that “the potential of conflict 
exists whenever individuals or groups pursue goals that they perceive to be 
incompatible” (Rubenstein, cf. Cheldelin, Druckman and Fast(eds.), 2003: 55), therefore 
it is not so likely for the receiver to easily perceive the literal meaning of the message.  
For example, when there is an argument in a newspaper stating that “the pro-conference 
parties’ in the conflict over the Armenian conference should also respect the rights of 
the anti-conference parties,” the intended meaning of the journalist might be to offer an 
alternative for cooperation , however, anti-conference parties may perceive that 
statement as “pro-conference parties are not respecting our own group’s rights, thus they 
should be blamed more.”  Therefore, a causal relationship with the statement and the 
situation of the parties’ own group has been built. Thus, the communication process 
would be fulfilled but the intended messages of communication could not be received.  
As a result, the process of communication would be poor. 
 
When poor communication occurs as a result of different interpretations of 
meanings, the desire of the parties for their own goals and values become rigid and the 
number of availability of perceived alternatives for a joint outcome lessen. What 
follows, according to Rubin, Pruitt and Kim, is a more severe conflict (Rubin, Pruitt and 
Kim, 1994:12). Thus, when the intended meaning cannot be perceived by its literal 
meaning, communication fails and the potential of failure of communication is high in 
conflict situations. 
 
 19 
 
 
2.2.3 Perspective-taking paradigm 
While the intentionalist paradigm emphasizes the importance of a sender’s 
intentions, the perspective-taking paradigm emphasizes the receiver’s intentions by 
assuming differences between individual world perceptions.  According to the 
perspective taking paradigm, the experiences of an individual would shape different 
views.  Although, adversaries should take into account each other’s perspectives, often 
in conflict situations it is more difficult to take the perspective of the other into account 
accurately because  the other seems more unlike oneself (Krauss and Morsella cf. 
Deutsch and Coleman eds., 2000).   
 
In addition, conflict is encouraged by zero-sum thinking, in which a party assumes 
that the more he/she gets the less for his/her adversary. Thus, in zero-sum thinking the 
main aim would be harming the other adversary (Rubin, Pruitt and Kim, 1994), which is 
a condition that discourages considering the perspective of the other. 
 
The three categorizations of communication done by Krauss and Morsella until 
now stresses the importance of the nature of the individual in the communication 
process.  However, communication, similar to conflict processes, are not only the result 
of individual’s interaction with each other but also the interaction of individuals with 
social situations.  Therefore, the fourth paradigm emphasizes external factors 
influencing the process of communication.  
 
 
 
2.2.4 Dialogic Paradigm 
Dialogic paradigm claims that the parties in conflict should be in collaborative 
communication to create meaning and set some similar conceptions as a first step to 
reduce their differences.  Subsequently, participants to communication are given an 
interactive role where they respond to each other jointly but the meanings in their 
message transmissions are perceived as socially constructed. Thus, for the dialogic 
paradigm, the context of the communication process is crucial to construct similar 
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meanings from each other’s messages (Krauss and Morsella, cf. Deutsch and Coleman 
eds., 2000).  
 
According to Rubenstein, in order to have a richer understanding of conflict, both 
the influence of human nature and the social situations or structures should be 
considered (Rubenstein, cf. Cheldelin, Druckman and Fast, 2003).  In the same manner, 
dialogic paradigm suggests that communication is a result of an individual’s interaction 
as well as the socially constructed meanings.  However, it is so hard for the parties in 
conflict to perceive the created meanings as socially constructed; thus it is not so likely 
to create a joint meaning because often social constructions such as culture, politics and 
socioeconomic conditions are the result of long established patterns of thought and 
behavior that parties cannot easily be aware of their effect in their conflict.  In addition, 
even if the adversaries are aware of the situational factors affecting the conflict, there is 
not an apparent line between human nature and social situations to pinpoint for the 
adversaries because humans are social beings.  In sum, it is not an easy task to perceive 
the meanings exchanged in communication as socially constructed as the dialogic 
paradigm suggests.   
 
The paradigms summarized by Krauss and Morsella (cf. Deutsch and Coleman 
eds., 2000) in the section above suggest that communication process has inherent 
problems. Even if one of the participants has been put in the role of passive recipient, as 
in the case of the encoding-decoding paradigm, there is the problem of distortion of 
message.  When participants are put in active but separate roles, as the cases in 
intentionalist and perspective taking-paradigm, individuals’ possible misconstruction of 
speakers’ intentions of the words and possible incorrect assumptions of the addressee’s 
point of view or frame of reference are other problems inherent to communication.  
Even though communication is formulated by depending on the interaction of the 
participants rather than an individualistic process, as in the case of the dialogic 
paradigm, context of their circumstances is the diagnostic factor for them to achieve 
similar understanding of meanings of each other’s messages.   
 
Until now, in the first two sections of this chapter, media are described as one of 
the establishers of communication processes; therefore, the inherent dynamics of 
communication are analyzed to indicate that communication through media is 
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influenced by inherent problems of any communication process. Although, some 
features of the nature of communication processes are described to emphasize the 
difficulties of communication in conflict situations, in the next part of this chapter, the 
nature of conflict is analyzed in detail to specifically determine the role of media in 
conflict. 
 
 
2.3 Nature of Conflict Processes 
 
 
In order to suggest a stronger link between conflict and communication through 
media, there is a need for conceptualization of the concept of ‘conflict,’ There are 
various frames of reference describing ‘conflict’ in conflict analysis and resolution 
literature.   
 
According to Kriesberg, “social conflict exists when two or more persons or 
groups manifest the belief that they have incompatible objectives”( Kriesberg, 1998: 2).  
Similarly, Deutsch defines conflict as "incompatible activities occur. . . . (which) may 
reflect differences in interests, desires, or values . . . or a rivalry in which one person 
tries to outdo the other" (Deutsch, 1973, Cf. Sweeney et.al. 1996: 156).   
 
Mitchell claims that conflict is the interrelation of three components “(i) a 
situation of incompatible goals; (ii) a range of psychological conditions experienced by 
the parties involved; (iii) a set of related behaviors used to achieve the disputed goals” 
(Mitchell, 1981: 32).   Thus, deriving from Kriesberg, Deutsch and Mitchell’s 
descriptions, conflict is the existence of incompatible objectives and activities in a 
relationship of at least two parties, in which simultaneous psychological changes exist 
and new psychological conditions emerge for the relation, which I can illustrate as: 
PARTY A     PARTY B   
   
I. incompatible objectives exist 
II. incompatible activities occur 
III. psychological changes experienced  
Figure 2.2 Dynamics of conflict 
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In parallel to the conceptualization of conflict for this study, Kempf agrees that 
there are three major inter-dependent aspects of conflict as issues (or objectives), 
positions (or activities) and cognitive frames (affecting psychological conditions) and 
that any change in any of the aspects may cause a change in the others.  However, he 
emphasizes that “both issues and positions result from an interpretation of conflict, i.e. 
from a complex co-construction of meaning embedded in some sort of cognitive 
framework” (Kempf et. al. ed., 2000: 16). 
 
Therefore, the existence of conflict at the beginning is lead by having a perception 
and establishing an accurate interpretation of conflict, such as a meaning emerges from a 
cognitive framework.  Kempf et al. (ed., 2003) define cognitive frameworks as including 
a variety of factors affecting the course of conflict such as conceptualization of conflict, 
interpretation of social norms, interpretation of conflicting parties’ hierarchy of values, 
and interpretation of attitudes toward each other.  Therefore, deriving from the 
explanations of Kempf et. al., the cognitive framework can be conceptualized as the 
constantly renewed interpretation of realities.   
 
Owing to usage of cognitive frameworks, media, while constituting a 
communication process, can attach different meanings to the same phenomenon.  For 
example, the meaning of conflict can vary for individuals when they receive different 
cognitive frameworks through media channels.  Therefore if “both issues and positions 
result from an interpretation of conflict” (Kempf et. al. ed., 2003:16), the course of 
conflict as a whole is affected.   
 
In sum, cognitive frameworks are products of different perceptions and 
interpretations that have a capacity to influence the course of conflict.  Although, this 
study does not claim that all conflicts exist and perpetuate only because of 
interpretations, the social psychological approach to conflict analysis and resolution is 
taken up as a reference for this study.  Since social psychologists are “…accustomed to 
thinking in terms of the impact of mental status on social behavior” (Rubin, Pruitt and 
Kim, 1994: 5), the road of approach in this study emphasizes the influences on mental 
status by also taking the complexity of the nature of conflict into account. 
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Believing that an analysis of the nature of communication and conflict is very 
important for identifying the role of media in conflict, in the next part of this chapter, I 
will indicate the position of media in conflict situations, role of media in conflict 
processes, and operation of media to carry out their role by scrutinizing the main 
theoretical explanations derived from communications literature as well as from the 
social psychological approaches in conflict analysis and resolution literature. 
 
 
2.4 The role of media in conflict 
 
 
Basic argument of this study is inspired from a common argument about the role 
of media, which claims that: 
 
   “media, being in between the segments of the society, have a certain 
influence in the construction of social reality. Media put issues on the 
agenda, provide information about facts and events, and offer a cognitive 
framework for society’s interpretation” (Kempf et.al.ed., 2003:18-19). 
 
Thereby, this study mainly suggests that media have power to portray conflict 
processes by cognitive frameworks, which influence the conflict interpretation and 
perception of the public.  In addition, media suggest cognitive frameworks by 
communicating with the public through the rhetoric.  Simply put, the process of 
communication carried out by media put into operation through language.  However, in 
a conflict process, not only the rhetoric is a crucial factor in the operation of media, but 
also the parties confronted with the media rhetoric are deeply important.  
 
Similarly, paradigms in communication literature indicate different intentions and 
world views of the senders and receivers of communication, selection distortion as a 
result of human nature or external factors, and the context of communication are central 
points to evaluate the flow of communication. Adversaries of a conflict use media 
channels to indirectly communicate with each other, and through media channels they 
send signals to each other and their target audiences.  Media members, who are also 
members of the society, use media channels to communicate with adversaries, their 
target audiences as well as the rest of the public.  In addition, Mitchell states that in 
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conflict situations, communication is used by  parties to influence or change each other’s 
positions and behaviors as well as to shape the view of adversaries’ targeted audience. 
However, at this point, multiple audiences create another complexity because it is hard 
to separate the target audience from the others (Mitchell, 1981), which might result in 
the involvement of different audiences to conflict or change in the perception of 
different audiences.   
 
 As a matter of fact, there is a complexity to list all of the senders and receivers of 
the communication processes established by the media because at large it is impossible 
to exactly identify the receivers, very difficult to specify the individual senders of 
information dispatched through media channels and the amount of effect that media 
received from the society while sending the messages. Indeed, it is impossible to 
identify the receivers because for example, although some companies search for 
circulation of newspapers and some search for ratings of TV and radio channels, the 
amount of circulation and ratings only indicate the number of people who sourced the 
newspaper or turned on their TV or radio but do not confirm if people read the news, 
watched or heard the information.  In addition, the difficulty of specifying the individual 
senders of information comes from the number of media members and the amount of 
information and interpretation.  For example, the information might be sent by a 
journalist who witnessed the real event or the information might also be second hand for 
media members.  In any case, the dynamism of media network and the social world as 
the source of huge amounts of information constraint determining the exact senders.  
Additionally, the amount of effect of the media by the society is indefinite because the 
individual members of media are social beings.  In this sense, the main constraint of this 
study is analyzing the media in general as the senders, but not pinpointing the exact 
receivers of message sent through the media and the way the rhetoric is constructed in 
media.     
 
Having this constraint in mind, the major objective of this study is to analyze the 
media rhetoric in transferring messages about a conflict escalation situation.  At the 
same time, the additional objective is to identify how conflict processes are interpreted 
by different media. The point of reference that leads this study is that good 
communication is not a guarantee for a conflict to be resolved, but poor communication 
most possibly increases the likelihood of the continuation of conflict or worsening of the 
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conflict situation (Krauss and Morsella, cf. Deutsch and Coleman eds., 2000).  Thus, 
media as the channels that have power to collectively inform and influence the societies 
by transferring messages including their assessment of the dynamics of conflict 
situations are to be questioned.  
 
For this reason, media is considered as an intervener to a conflict because media 
intervene in the relations between the adversaries’ and influences their inter-
communication by offering designed interpretations.  In this process, the relations of 
adversaries with their target audience, and the rest of the society are also paying 
attention to information and interpretation offered by the media.  Therefore, I illustrate a 
hypothetical communication and relational processes under media intervention in order 
to identify the position of media in conflicts as below:   
 
 
PARTY A           PARTY B 
 
 
 
  TARGET AUDIENCE OF PARTY A    TARGET AUDIENCE OF PARTY B 
  
 
 
 
REST OF THE PUBLIC RECEIVING INFORMATION FROM MEDIA 
  Figure 2.3 Communication Processes - Media Intervention 
 
Arrows between different actors are to illustrate the communication processes and 
relations where media might intervene in any of them by influencing incompatible 
objectives, activities and psychological changes, which occur in conflict. 
 
It is clear from the illustration that media have a place in between different groups 
in the society.  In addition to being between them, the position of media is influencing 
the relations and inter-communications of the receivers as illustrated above, then media 
have a role that should be taken into consideration, especially when media offer 
MEDIA 
MEDIA 
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cognitive frameworks in conflict processes because interpretation is one of the keys of  a 
conflict’s development.   
 
In sum, there are basic acknowledgements needed in order to clarify the aim of 
questioning the media rhetoric and the variation of rhetoric in conflict situations. One is 
that the inherent difficulties of communication processes in conflict situations do not 
change the fact that communication is a central part of conflict. Secondly, media have a 
potential for worsening the conflict through shaping perception by the use of rhetoric.  
Thus, fourthly,  media is assumed to be an intervener to a conflict by offering cognitive 
frameworks, which shape perceptions of adversaries’, target audience of adversaries and 
the rest of the public.   Therefore, lastly, media’s influence is assumed to be more on the 
cognitive level because the basic role of media is to inform the masses and cognition is 
developed through information.  However, since media are not monolithic but composed 
of various channels, the way of intervention of each medium is different.  Therefore, 
cognitive frameworks helping to shape the perceptions are various.  
 
In the next part of this chapter, in order to analyze the nature of media intervention 
by rhetoric, there are four questions to be answered:  How can the intervention of media 
be conceptualized ? What type of intervention do the media manifest in conflict? How 
does the media intervention operate? Why is one of the functions of media intervention 
going to be analyzed in this study?  
 
 
2.5 Nature of Media Intervention in Conflict Processes 
 
 
In order to have a clear understanding of what media intervention in a conflict 
means, firstly, there is a need for conceptualization of ‘intervention.’  There are various 
frames of reference describing ‘conflict intervention’ in conflict analysis and resolution 
literature. After analyzing conflict intervention, the operation of media is scrutinized in 
order to evaluate the nature of media intervention in conflict processes.   
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2.5.1 Conflict Intervention 
According to James Laue, “conflict intervention occurs when an outside or semi-
outside party self-consciously enters into a conflict situation with the objective of 
influencing the conflict in a direction the intervener defines as desirable” (Laue, 1987:20 
Cf. Cheldelin, Druckman and Fast eds., 2003).  So, Laue claims that the conflict 
intervener is the one altering the conflict and it can be an insider-partial intervener or an 
outside party.  In a similar way, Kriesberg defines intermediaries as the actors 
intervening in the conflict.  Accordingly, intermediaries often contribute to alter the 
conflict from a destructive situation to a constructive one but with the risk of failure and 
hamper the success of the agreements.  According to Kriesberg, intermediaries are to 
provide a space for communication and information, and generate pressures for 
agreement (1998).   
 
On the other hand, Princen claims that the intervention of intermediaries are done 
by “third parties who intercede for the purpose of influencing or facilitating the 
settlement of a dispute but who do not impose a solution.  They are actors with 
incentives to be involved but without direct interests in the disputed issues” ( Princen, 
1992: 3).  Thus, by deriving from the descriptions from the literature above it is apparent 
that conflict intervention can be implemented by an outside figure as well as by a semi-
outsider or insider-partial party, who is aware of being an interceder.  At the same time, 
the reasons of intervention can vary.  The intervention might be to offer space for 
communication and information, motivate parties to come to an agreement by exerting 
some pressure, or facilitating the dispute.  In any ways, the result of the intervention is 
the alteration of conflict. 
 
In order to weigh the general nature of media intervention subsequently, interested 
secondary party intervention to a conflict should be explained as well.  While the 
primary parties are those who are directly related with the issues of a conflict, third 
parties are often outsiders to a conflict and facilitate the disputes without imposing a 
solution. Interested secondary parties, however, are those “who have an indirect stake in 
the outcome of the dispute but who do not feel themselves to be directly involved” 
(Wilmot & Hocker, 2001: 202).  Ohlson and Söderberg describe secondary parties as an 
actor that supports in some way a primary party who is one of the pa
 28 
disagreement (2002).  Thus, as Kriesberg warns, there is a risk of failure and worsening 
the conflict in interventions.  When the intervener is an interested secondary party, who 
is an actual supporter of one of the adversaries, the risk of failure is more likely to rise 
because the trust between the intervener is more likely to be damaged.  Therefore, in 
conflict intervention, in addition to the figure of the intervener, reasons to intervene and 
the outcome of the intervention, the point of view of the intervener about the conflict 
situation is crucial. 
 
Since, in this study, media is the central figure under consideration as an 
intervener to conflict processes, to understand the reasons and outcome as well as the 
point of views of media interventions, it is exceedingly important to understand how 
media perform the intervention. 
 
 
2.5.2 How do Media Operate? 
Although, until now, the attempt to define the nature of the media intervention in a 
conflict is driven by describing and weighing the conflict intervention process, it is also 
necessary to point out the functions of the media.  Taking Mitchell’s conceptualization 
of conflict as a milestone and incorporating other studies, this study considers four ways 
of media to perform intervention.  Thus, four ways of operation of media are analyzed to 
suggest that the media influence on incompatible goal orientations, psychological 
conditions and behaviors of the parties in conflict is carried out by cognitive frameworks 
that might be altering the public perception about the conflict..   
 
First of all, news media are one of the sources that give an individual some 
information about the events that occur, so media are sources of limited information.  
Nonetheless the media also portray conflict by adding interpretation, so media are 
sources of evaluated reality. Thirdly, often media are the only link of the public to the 
conflict process where different media units indicate different critiques of the process of 
conflict and parties involved, thus, media are an indirect intervention mechanism of the 
society over conflicts.  Lastly, the media function on a competitive profit-making market 
that the amount of profit depends on how much they address the positions of the society, 
so media are a space of competition of different world views.  
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2.5.2.1 Media as sources of limited information 
By being a source of limited information, the media cover the news about conflicts 
but do not offer a detailed picture of their background or reasons behind the behaviors of 
the parties but only give the information about a conflict situation which is newsworthy. 
Thus, the limited information about conflict transmitted through media to the public 
might be distorted because each medium might have different priority when choosing a 
conflict situation to be on the news, or various journalists transmit the information, 
which means various messages from the media are loaded with various perceptions 
since journalists are members of a society. 
 
 In addition, it should be kept in mind that media not only use reports to cover the 
news.  For example, newspapers are not only composed of consecutive paragraphs but 
there are opinion editorials, columns, news stories, in different shape such as titles and 
subtitles of different size, illustration of pictures and symbols.  Also, TV news are not 
only composed of news segments by speakers but also have scenes from the conflict 
situation and different critiques are being done through various types of programs.  
Therefore, when we consider the occurrence of one event, it is not surprising to see the 
media covering the event through distinct pieces of information by distinct tools.  In 
sum, the media only give us a partial view of the world because events are becoming 
‘news’ when they are found newsworthy and selected for inclusion in reports (Fowler, 
1991: 11). Therefore, as stated by Cohen, the press is stunningly successful in telling its 
readers what to think about if not in telling people what to think (McCombs and Shaw, 
Cf.Boyd-Barrett and Newbold, 1995: 154).  
 
 
2.5.2.2 Media as a source of Evaluated Reality 
By being a source of evaluated reality, the media influence the cognitive reality of 
the individuals by selecting the pieces of information to be transformed according to 
distinct editorial choices.  Often this transformation of information through different 
priorities has been studied under the ‘theory of framing.’   
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According to Entman: 
 
   “Framing essentially involves selection and salience.  To frame is to select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993: 52). 
 
Therefore, the notion of framing indicates a specific way in which influence over a 
human consciousness is performed by the transfer of information from one location—
such as a speech, utterance, news report, or novel — to that consciousness (Entman, 
1993).  By framing particular definitions and interpretations of situations that are used, 
media professionals package the information in such a way to represent the reality that 
can influence the public opinion (Beaudoin and Thorson, Cf.Gilboa ed., 2002:154).  
Thus, frames are a kind of evaluated reality that have the power to shift or modify the 
values of the individuals.  However, the important question is what might be a result of 
a shift in the values and opinions of the individuals. 
 
Rothman et.al. think of frames as helpful to organize conflict theory because 
according to them frames can signify different perspectives, which provide lens to the 
world of conflict (Rothman et. al., 2001).  Similarly, Bolman and Deal (1984) and 
Friedman and Lipshitz (1994) argue that by frames, theorists and practitioners focus 
their attention to particular aspects of the conflict situation, formulate the problem, and 
guide conflict (Cf. Rothman et. al. 2001). However, as Dearborn and Simon (1958) 
suggest, frames may also be limiting and lead to selective perception (Cf. Rothman et. 
al. 2001). 
 
On the other hand, although the media influences the values of opinions by 
choosing which evaluation is newsworthy, people  who work in the media to select the 
best evaluation are also influenced by their own characteristics and the social processes.  
Thus, Deutsch claims that: 
 
   “everyone has been a participant and observer in many conflicts from 
childhood, thus has implicit knowledge, preconceptions, attitudes, and 
modes of behavior toward conflict. Thus, a person’s preexisting orientations 
to conflict, and behavior might be reflecting those salient in his or her 
culture, but some reflect individual knowledge acquired from unique 
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experiences in the context of family, school, watching TV, and the like”  
(Deutsch and Coleman eds. , 2000: 37). 
 
The same process is valid for the people who transmit or evaluate the news about 
conflicts.  So, if journalists are also the ones who are influenced by distinct experiences, 
the evaluated reality transmitted by the media should vary not only by usage of different 
frames but also personal orientations of media members to a conflict. The members of 
media may not be aware of cognitive frameworks they offer, however, although they 
actually transfer their own pattern of interpretation to the society through the mechanical 
tools of media such as TV, radio, journals, newspapers and this transference occurs 
through medium’s rhetorical patterns. 
 
 
2.5.2.3 Media as an Indirect Intervention Mechanism of Society in Conflicts 
The media as a prominent critique to the process of conflict and parties involved 
serve as an indirect intervention mechanism of society to conflicts.   Not only the media 
influence the public and adversaries’ opinion formation but they are also influenced by 
the parties of conflict and public. Therefore, when the media send messages and offer 
evaluated realities, the message and evaluations indirectly include intervention by 
existent social cognition.  On the other hand, the political position of mediums are 
important in order to understand the nature of indirect intervention.  For example, if the 
owner and members of the medium are more prone to support one political segment in 
the society, it is more likely that the direction of intervention to be close to a group’s 
position.   
 
 
2.5.2.4 Media as a Space for Competition of Different World Views 
There are two prominent approaches leading the scholarly attention that describe 
the media space.  Some agree that the media contain different competitions, while some 
others think that the media as a whole serve one world view. Major debate is between 
liberal-pluralist and Marxist theoretical accounts on how media work. Keynes briefly 
explains that the pluralist track see media in control in the hands of an autonomous 
managerial elite who allow a degree of flexibility to professionals and there is symmetry 
between the audience and media institutions where audiences are capable of 
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manipulating the media according to their priorities.  Marxist tradition on the other 
hand, see media professionals as internalizing the norms of the hegemonic culture and 
their interpretive works are for the interests of dominant classes and audiences are 
unable to reject the accepted definitions offered by media (Cf .Curran, Gurevitch 1998).  
Suggesting a space of competition for media, this study is more close to the liberal-
pluralist view of the media. 
 
Thus, the competition space of media is argued to be composed of managerial 
elites and some flexibility of their professionals, which allows a certain diversity of 
frameworks offered by the media.  Therefore, the media represent distinct ideas; thus, 
distinct cognitive frameworks. Apparently, media intervene with abovementioned four 
operational actions all of which have link to one major tool of media in intervention and 
that is cognitive framework carried out by rhetorical patterns of media.  
 
 
2.5.3. Major Tools of Media Intervention: Cognitive Framework and 
Rhetoric 
The major argument of this study is inspired from a common argument in the 
literature about media: 
 
   “Media, being in between the segments of the society, have a certain 
influence in the construction of social reality. Media put issues on the 
agenda, provide information about facts and events, and offer a cognitive 
framework for society’s interpretation” (Kempf et.al.ed., 2003:18-19).  
 
Similarly, Davis (1990) presents a summary of the social construction of reality 
approach to the news media, which is the broader theoretical explanation to suggest that 
the media have partial influence in the social reality construction.  According to social 
construction of reality theory:  
 
“we live in a fundamentally ambiguous social world – a world in which 
persons, objects, and actions have no inherent or essential meaning.  If 
meaning is not inherent, then it must be created – imposed on action, events, 
or things through human action” (Davis, 1990 Cf. Wolsfeld, 1997: 32).  
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Fowler refers to Chomsky’s starting sentence in his volume called Language and 
Mind, which states  “the particular branch of cognitive psychology known as 
linguistics.”  Furthermore, Fowler claims that although the product of the linguist’s 
analysis is a property of a speaker’s cognitive system, there is a reciprocity for example 
between writers and readers of a newspaper.   Fowler explains this reciprocity with the 
existent of level of consensus between readers and writer, and the establishment of a 
familiar style is fundamental to the building of consensus, which has been identified as 
the centre of ideological practice of newspapers.  Thus according to Fowler there is an 
ideology of consensus in the media to manage the relations with government and capital 
as well as with the individual readers (Fowler, 1991).   
 
Similarly, Stuart Hall proposes ‘mode of address’ to explain different rhetoric of 
mediums.  According to Hall mode of address:  
 
   “means that the same topic, sources and inferential structures will appear 
differently even in papers with a similar outlook, since the different rhetoric 
of address will have an important effect in inflecting the original item.  Of 
special importance in determining the particular mode of address adopted 
will be the particular parts of readership spectrum the paper sees itself as 
customarily addressing.  The language employed will thus be the 
newspaper’s own version of the language of the public to whom it is 
principally addressed: its version of rhetoric, imagery and underlying 
common stock of knowledge which it assumes its audience shares and which 
thus forms the basis of the reciprocity of producer/reader” (Hall, 1980 cf. 
Fowler, 1991: 48). 
 
Thereby, it is convenient to offer that a medium with its power to portray conflict 
processes according to its own cognitive frameworks has its own version of language 
which is equal to its rhetorical pattern to achieve a tacit consensus in its relation with its 
readers.  Therefore, each medium has a particular ‘political motive for conveying 
approval of a stable, familiar ideology’ (Fowler, 1991: 49) and ‘its own version of the 
language’ (Hall, cf. Fowler 1991: 48). Until now the help of rhetoric to transfer 
cognitive frameworks has been discussed; yet, the influence of cognitive frames on the 
meaning of conflict situation is the question waiting to be answered. 
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2.5.3.1 Operation of Cognitive Frameworks 
According to Heider, an individual organizes attitudes toward people and objects 
in relation to one another within that individual’s own cognitive structure (Cf. Severin 
and Tankard, 1997:160).  Thus, the first step for an individual to change his or her 
attitude is to come into contact with information that differs from his or her own 
attitudes.   
 
Severin and Tankard refer to Osgood’s congruity theory in order to analyze the 
role of cognitive changes by media messages on the attitudes of people.  According to 
Osgood’s congruity model: 
 
   “for an attitude change to take place, a person must come into contact with 
information that differs from his or her present attitudes... a person (P) 
receives an assertion from a source (S) toward which he or she has an 
attitude, about an object (O) toward which he or she has an attitude...and 
how much P likes S and O will determine is a state of congruity or 
consistency exists... Incongruity occurs when the attitudes toward the source 
and the object are similar and the assertion is negative or when they are 
dissimilar and the assertion is positive” (Cf. Severin and Tankard, 1997: 
162).   
 
The major importance of incongruity or inconsistency is that people who received 
information about a conflict situation tend to use the information according to their own 
position.  As Severin and Tankard warn “if we do receive a message that causes 
incongruity, we may misperceive the message to make it fit our view of reality” (1997: 
164).  This means that a medium must pay more attention to the rhetorical patterns of 
transmission of information in conflict situations. 
 
Another theory, which has a major role in conflict processes is the ‘cognitive 
dissonance theory’ by Festinger (Festinger 1957 Cf. Barker 2003).  The cognitive 
dissonance theory explains the idea of cognitions as bits of knowledge that can pertain 
to any variety of thoughts, values, facts, or emotions (Barker, 2003).  Moreover, a 
summary of cognitive dissonance theory is as follows: 
 
   “The basic idea behind cognitive dissonance theory is that people do not 
like to have dissonant cognitions. In fact, many people argue that the desire 
to have consonant cognitions is as strong as our basic desires for food and 
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shelter. As a result, when someone does experience two or more dissonant 
cognitions (or conflicting thoughts), they will attempt to do away with the 
dissonance” (Barker, 2003).  
 
Thus, the media’s cognitive frames for conflicts are often used to rationalize a 
receiver’s existent perception and the data sent by the media used to be fit in the existing 
variety of information about the conflict situation.  Therefore, the media has the 
influence to change this cognition by using different frames.  However, selecting to 
establish a conciliatory rhetoric depends on a medium’s ideological practice and 
versions of language they choose to use.  
 
 
2.5.4 Summary of the Nature of Media Intervention in Conflict 
Concerning all the characteristics of conflict and media intervention separately, 
the type and aim of the media intervention do not definitely have the same nature with 
third or interested secondary parties in conflict intervention literature.  The results of the 
media intervention have the potential to influence perception of conflict 
conceptualization by the receivers; and therefore might possibly cause cognitive changes 
in parties because an individual organizes attitudes toward people and objects in relation 
to one another within that individual’s own cognitive structure and when an individual 
comes into contact with information that differs from his or her own attitudes (Haider, 
Cf. Severin and Tankard, 1997:160).  Therefore, the result of media intervention, 
although sometimes it might not be self consciously, is an alteration in conflict. 
 
On the other hand, it is possible to argue, in general, that sometimes medium 
might have a direct interest in the disputed issue because there is a certain ideological 
practice to address the medium’s readers and a convenient rhetoric to that ideological 
practice.  Therefore, some media might be closer to one segment of the society by being 
far away from the other segment.  In this sense, it is also possible to be self conscious 
for a medium to achieve the alteration in conflict as a result.   
 
Although, this study suggested that third party roles defined in the conflict 
literature are not similar and often cannot be generalized for the media intervention, it is 
possible to claim that media intervention explores knowledge and suggest a cognitive 
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representation of a problem through transference of cognitive frameworks.  Thus, the 
media, by interpreting the relational indicators between conflicting parties play a role in 
changing the relational climate of the parties, which means media have their incentive to 
facilitate the settlement of a dispute by generating diverse options for the relation of the 
parties.  However, again playing a role in change in thinking and relations does not 
provide clear evidence that the media are third party.  However, it suggests that media 
definitely intervenes in the relations of adversaries and the way of thinking about 
conflict processes by transferring diverse frameworks for the use of parties.  In addition, 
being an indirect intervener to conflict situations and without a clear approval from the 
parties to a conflict are the differences of the media from a third party.  Also, mostly, 
media is an indirect monitor over the parties in conflict but it does not guarantee an 
agreement or bind any agreement.  As Ross claims: 
 
   “A reliable, diverse and independent news media has an almost innate 
potential for contributing to conflict. It functions as a channel of 
communication that  counteracts misperceptions. It frames and analyzes the 
conflict, identifies the interests, defuses mistrust, provides safe emotional 
outlets, and more... The media thus becomes a facilitator of positive social 
change rather than a professional, disinterested observer/reporter. Under no 
circumstances, however, is the promotion of biased information or 
viewpoints masquerading as journalism a valid approach” (Ross, 2002: 3-4). 
 
 
However, media have the ability to be a third party, and often do not directly 
contribute to conflicts as a third party as Ross would like media to do.  As mentioned 
before, sometimes media can play the role of an interested secondary party with its 
ideological practices when a conflict is related to the audience that is addressed by the 
medium.  Therefore, the greater importance in this study is given to the variation of 
medium’s rhetoric depending on its ideological practices.  Thus, the main focus is 
distinct rhetoric shaped by different cognitive frameworks and intervening in the 
conflict.  Thus, in the data analysis chapter of this study, each newspaper is defined as 
an interested secondary party intervening in the Armenian conference conflict offering 
distinct cognitive frameworks by using different patterns of rhetoric. 
 
However, before evaluating the application of media intervention by diverse 
rhetoric, I wish to denote the importance of timing of the media intervention in a conflict 
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in the next chapter that would provide a promising step towards evaluating the level of 
influence of media intervention conflict.  
 
 
2.6 Timing of Media Intervention to Conflict 
 
 
Timing of intervention most often is a focus of conflict prevention literature. 
Among all questions, “When should the international community intervene in 
conflicts?” has initiated a great debate between scholars focusing on conflict prevention. 
It is because “...the concept of timing is based on preferences and also on conventional 
beliefs about when de-escalation efforts are likely to be effective” (Kriesberg, cf. 
Kriesberg and Thorson ed., 1991:1).  Jentleson, Nicolaidis, Stedman and Zartman are 
some of the leading scholars emphasizing the crucial importance of “timing” in 
intervention (Jentleson, 1998; Nicolaidis, 1996; Stedman, 1995; Zartman, 2001).  While 
Jentleson argues that the international community should intervene “early” to prevent 
disputes from escalating (1998), Nicolaidis argues that although an early intervention 
can sometimes save greater costs, the early interventions must take into account the risk 
of “pervasive” effect.  According to her, before the early intervention, the need for the 
prevention should be well identified by distinguishing between the situations where 
conflicts are likely or unlikely to erupt into violence (Nicolaidis, 1996).   
 
In addition to the need for prevention, Zartman claims that to identify the time for 
intervention there must be some definable opportunity for the external parties to seize, 
which may enable the beginning of new course of events (2001).  Stedman indicates that 
conflicts must be intensified before they are resolved (1995) and Zartman adds that the 
condition of ‘ripeness’ should force the parties to seek or accept help in order to find a 
way out of the conflict. The debates in conflict prevention literature show that timing of 
intervention is crucial because the time of intervention is influential in determining the 
existent intensity of the conflict, opportunities of the intervener for the intervention, and 
the future development of a conflict.  Besides, the development of a conflict is always 
dynamic and changing.   
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Although there are different approaches to when to intervene in a conflict, this 
study has used a more descriptive approach and explained the influences of timing of 
media intervention on conflict dynamics. Also, this study does not discuss a right timing 
of media intervention but explains the existent intervention time of the media that 
influence the dynamics of conflict. Below is a description of conflict stages underlining 
the changing character of conflict dynamics by time trajectory to indicate the exact 
timing of media intervention in the following sections of this chapter.  
 
 
 2.7 Conflict Stages 
 
 
According to Kriesberg “a conflict between adversaries varies in intensity over 
time.  Particular disputes may lie dormant for years, then emerge into awareness, 
escalate in intensity, begin to de-escalate, and be settled or resolved, perhaps to emerge 
in a different form years later” (Kriesberg, 1982 Cf. Kriesberg and Thorson eds. 1991: 
5). 
 
However, it is common to depict a hypothetical continuum of conflict as passing 
through distinct stages, which indicates that conflict is a process with a life history 
depending on two dimensions as time and intensity as below: 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Continuum of conflict. (Kriesberg, 2003) 
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As it is apparent from the illustration above, a conflict between adversaries might 
change toward a state of heightened tension and hostilities and more contentious tactics, 
or toward a state where this is reduced ( Pearson desire, Cf. Cheldelin, Druckman and 
Fast ed., 2003).  Although the life continuum of conflict represents consecutive stages of 
conflict, conflict stages may not develop consecutively.  For example, a conflict may 
escalate and without reaching a stalemate may directly become subject to negotiation.  
On the other hand, the differences between stages are blurred when we analyze real 
conflict cases.  For example, categorizing an event as a stalemate may not be obvious 
for parties inside and outside the conflict. Yet, all stages in the continuum of conflict are 
briefly described to subsequently clarify the unique feature of the escalation phase for 
media intervention.  
 
Mitchell describes latent conflict stage as “the existence of situation of 
conflict...conflict behavior do not occur” (1981: 32) and suggests three sets of 
conditions for a conflict to be latent.  First of all, according to Mitchell, conditions are 
that when a conflict situation is not recognized by one or both parties, but who have 
mutually incompatible goals and values.  Secondly, when both parties recognize the 
conflict situation but there is an existence of too many other goals to be sacrificed for 
the pursuit of mutually incompatible goals.  Lastly, when the conflict situation is 
recognized by parties but potential costs of actual conflict behavior in pursuit of desired 
goals perceived as too high or impossible to achieve (Mitchell, 1981). 
 
In addition, Kempf underlines that latent conflicts are those that consist of 
incompatible goals not apparent to adversaries, which “at any moment might produce 
unintended negative consequences for the other party that the other party will probably 
experience as an unjustified attack (Kempf et. al. ed., 2003:15).   
 
According to Kriesberg, “a conflict emerges when members of one or more 
potential conflict parties develop a shared identity, generate a sense of grievance,  for a 
goal that another party, being responsible for the grievance, be changed, and come to 
believe that they can bring about that change” (Kriesberg, 1998: 91).  
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Escalation stage is when there is manifest opposition that adversaries attempt to 
attain their goals and intensify the means used and rally support for their cause 
(Kriesberg, 1998). According to Kriesberg, “escalation is driven by changes within each 
of the conflict parties, by evolving patterns of interaction between adversaries, and by 
developments affecting previously uninvolved parties who join the struggle” ( 
Kriesberg,1998: 152).  This means escalation is a very dynamic process and always 
subject to rapid further escalation because interactions between adversaries are often 
affected from many outside and domestic factors.  “Each step in escalation may be 
traced to changes in perceptions, in patterns of behavior, and in structures” (Pearson 
d’estrée, Cf. Cheldelin, Druckman and Fast ed., 2003: 86). The changes that drive the 
escalation are discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
 
Once conflicts escalate for a while, they often reach a stalemate: a situation in 
which neither side can win, but neither side wants to back down or accept loss either. 
Stalemates emerge for a number of reasons: failed tactics, depletion of available 
resources to fuel the conflict, a reduction in support of the conflict by group members or 
allies, or costs becoming too high to continue (Brahm, 2003). 
 
The concept of ‘hurting stalemate,’ on the other hand, is suggested by Zartman, 
who argued settlement for negotiation can be successful when a conflict is ripe for 
‘settlement’ where both sides should realize that they cannot achieve their aims by 
violence any more and it is costly to go on attempting to achieve their aims (Zartman ed. 
1996, Cf. Miall, Rambotsham and Woodhouse, 1999).  
 
Kriesberg and Thorson refer to de-escalation as a reduction in one more 
dimensions of the intensity in conflict behavior between adversaries (1991).  
Additionally, “conflicts ... de-escalate through changes in perceptions, patterns of 
behavior, and structures, and these changes can be consciously directed using various 
intervention strategies” (Pearson d’estrée, Cf. Cheldelin, Druckman and Fast ed., 2003: 
86). 
 
Dispute settlement refers to the working on a mutually satisfactory agreement 
between the parties involved in conflict. Dispute settlement is primarily aimed at 
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bringing the dispute to an end, without necessarily dealing with its fundamental causes, 
which often are perceived as the beginning of negotiations (Spangler, 2003). 
 
Peace building means intensifying efforts to establish lasting peace and to resolve 
conflicts peacefully in societies marked by conflict (Ross, 2002: 5).  In parallel, Galtung 
suggest that “peace building tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of 
conflict” (Galtung, 1996 Cf. Miall, Rambotsham and Woodhouse, 1999: 22).  The affect 
of media intervention has often been studied for this period.   
 
 
2.8 Timing of Media Intervention in a Conflict 
 
 
This study argues that media intervention to a conflict in conflict escalation stage 
is crucial to analyze the media rhetoric of that stage because “the media are rarely 
interested in a conflict before it erupts” (Rupesinghe and Anderlini, 1998: 72) because 
people are interested more when media give news about a conflict.  Therefore, when a 
conflict erupts, media sell more news and gain more profit.  Similarly, this study argues 
that the public is more dependent on media sources when there is an escalation in an 
existing - often protracted - conflict because media are inclined to report conflict news 
more than before when there is an escalation in conflict. Also, public attention seeks 
more information flow because of the possibility of further escalation that often make 
them worry or more curious about the Armenian conference.  Secondly, when consensus 
is strong in the prevailing pattern of political debate, media tend to stay within the limits 
of the political discussion; when it breaks down, coverage becomes increasingly critical 
and diverse in the viewpoints it represents (Tumber, 1994 Cf. Gilboa ed. 2002).  Lastly, 
Entman et. al. argue, during an international crisis, the ability of the media to influence 
public opinion is precise because the public is highly dependent on media as a main 
source for information (Lehman and Wilzig Cf. Gilboa, 2002 : 157).   
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In these senses, timing of media intervention can be illustrated as below: 
 
Figure 2.5 Timing of media intervention 
 
Since the intervention of media in conflict escalation stage is more apparent and 
influential, the analysis of this study will have a validity problem since media begins to 
intervene only in the escalation period, the pattern of rhetoric may be driven from the 
nature of escalation and the second problem is that media is not analyzed in other stages 
of the conflict.  However, the prior issue of validity comes from the nature and timing of 
media functions so that there is not much to do about it. 
 
Social psychological dynamics are explained in the next section, resulting from 
the nature of conflict escalation process to argue that media are often most influential on 
these dynamics in escalation stage by its rhetoric.  
 
 
2.9. Social Psychological Nature of Conflict Escalation 
 
 
While explaining the stages of conflict, it is mentioned that escalation stage is the 
existence of manifest opposition and adversaries’ attempt to attain their goals by 
intensifying the means to gain support (Kriesberg, 1998).  However, the phase of 
escalation has a dynamic nature, which is argued to be influenced more by the 
intervention of media because the timing of media intervention occurs often in the 
escalation period.  Therefore, evaluating social psychological nature of escalation has a 
great importance since media often influence people’s image by offering cognitive 
 
Media 
intervention 
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frameworks through rhetoric. Therefore,  media influence the inherent social 
psychological changes occurring in conflict escalation.  
 
Kriesberg (1998: 153) summarizes the social psychological conditions of conflict 
escalation:  
• Justification in the mind: One of the explanations is the remark of cognitive 
dissonance theory.  This theory claims that people’s commitment to an action is often 
sought to be justified by their minds, therefore, when the cause of an action is valued 
more, more harmful, acts can be justified.   
• Entrapment: Another process that contributes to continuation of the escalation 
of struggles is increasing commitment to the goal because of investing beyond the value 
of the goals.  This is called entrapment in social psychological analysis of conflict.   
• Selective perception is another process that contributes to conflict escalation 
where people are inclined to pay attention to the phenomena fitting their expectations 
that might lead to mutual complaints of adversaries since they will avoid other party’s 
notices.   
• Threat makes adversaries feel more pressure where parties are inclined to 
perceive few alternatives for the resolution of conflict and they tend to repeat their 
previous conduct.  
• Emotions such as fear and anger arise when people feel attacked and to express 
those emotions on the presumed attacker contributes to conflict escalation because the 
perceived attacker would be emotionally harmed as a result.  Not acknowledging such 
feelings prevents developing constructive ways to wage conflict.  
 
Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994) define escalation and state that in escalation the 
intensity of the conflict as a whole might be increasing.  More clearly than their 
definition, they establish a ‘structural change model’ to indicate the processes when 
escalation takes place.  
 
According to their structural model, perceived divergence of interest causes 
heavier tactics against the other party and tends to produce changes, which encourages 
the heavier tactics by the other party that again cause the first party to use more pressure 
and start this cycle.  These structural changes in Rubin, Pruitt and Kim’s (1994) model 
are as follows: 
 44 
 
• Psychological changes including change in hostile and competitive goals, 
negative attitudes and perception, de-individuation and dehumanization that have a 
nature of persistence and often develop zero-sum thinking  
• Changes in groups or collectivities such as group polarization, development of 
strengthened norms, development of contentious group goals, increase in the group 
cohesiveness, militant leaders might take over, and militant subgroups might develop  
• Changes in the community occur by community polarization, which indicates 
the affiliation of community members with adversarial groups.  
 
Each of these conditions are subject to media intervention since adversaries have 
many interactions in the escalation process through media. 
 
 
2.9.1 Persistence of Conflict Escalation 
 
Rubin, Pruitt and Kim discuss the confirmatory mechanisms that lead escalation to 
be persistent and they focus on the persistence of the abovementioned structural 
changes.  Rubin, Pruitt and Kim’s psychological confirmatory mechanisms are:  
 
(1)  Self-fulfilling prophecy where one party’s view of the other party encourages 
one to behave in a way that annoys the other, thus other parties response to that behavior 
confirms the primary view;  
(2)  Rationalization of behavior, which adversaries’ hostile actions are reaffirmed 
the views that creates those actions;  
(3) Selective perception might exist such as:  
(3.1) selective evaluation of behavior when evaluation of same event differs when 
there are the strong views,  
(3.2) preconceptions are confirmed through selecting evidences of information 
about the behaviors of the other party,  
(3.3) attributional bias where “...information in keeping Party’s expectations is 
seen as reflecting Other’s enduring characteristic, whereas information that violates 
Party’s expectations is attributed to temporary environmental pressures on the 
Other.”(p.105);  
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(4) Autistic hostility means that parties stop communicating each other.   
 
On the other hand, there are mechanisms that lead to perpetuation of structural 
changes – sometimes further escalation – in the group. One is the social pressure that is 
mainly based on constructed norms leading to encouragement of contentious goals by 
labeling the ones who do not obey those norms as traitors.  Another mechanism is the 
existence of vested interests or benefits conducted to motivate the group member to 
defend their pre-designed contentious goals (Rubin, Pruitt and Kim, 1994).  Similarly, 
Mitchell emphasizes the psychological dimensions of conflict and claims that “inter-
related cluster of emotions, attitudes, prejudices and perceptual distortions accompany 
most forms of conflict, and lead to its continuation and exacerbation” (1981:71).   
    
 According to Mitchell, there are many underlying protective inter-connected 
psychological processes that shape conflict attitudes of the parties where those shaped 
attitudes result in perpetuation of the conflict and often escalate them.  However, the 
basis of Mitchell’s arguments is that parties are attempting to avoid the unacceptable 
level of stress of the conflict through simplifying the process and cognitive categories 
and both of these attempts are to achieve cognitive consistency.   
 
Some of the common processes to achieve this consistency are selective recall, as 
a sub-process of selective perception, which is the use of past events to fit in with 
current images of the conflict or adversary; stereotyping, which means selecting 
particular attributes shared by the out-group, thinking that each member of that group 
has the same stereotyped characteristics and avoiding to see the out-group members’ 
differences.  
 
Being in parallel with Rubin, Pruitt and Kim’s, Mitchell’s study has an important 
argument that the abovementioned activated psychological processes leads to images of 
self and enemy, perceptions and evaluations that re-occur in conflict and shapes conflict 
attitudes of the parties (Mitchell, 1981). 
 
Therefore, the major argument leading this paper is that the members of media 
may not be aware of their own cognitive frameworks, however, although they actually 
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transfer the pattern of interpretation in relation to their ideological preferences; thus 
trigger or perpetuate the social psychological processes of conflict escalation. 
 
 
2.10 Media Intervention in Conflict Escalation 
 
 
Society is communicated to through the mechanical tools of media such as TV, 
radio, journals, newspapers; they basically transfer by rhetorical patterns.  According to 
Kempf, rhetorical patterns are established by conception of the past, conception of the 
situation and conception of the future and the influence of people’s intentions (Kempf 
et.al. ed, 2003).  Thus, rhetorical patterns can exist in any suggestion that is linked to an 
ideological position.   
 
Therefore, rhetorical patterns are conceptualized, for this study, as repeated ways 
of interpretation of the past, current situation and future of conflicts and adversary 
relations, limiting alternative ways of interpretations. That is why it is suggested that 
media’s rhetorical patterns influence by shaping of the cognitive frameworks; thus 
influence psychological changes of the adversaries as well as the other members of the 
community.  Therefore, using an escalation-oriented or de-escalation oriented rhetoric 
matter when the media interpret a conflict escalation process. 
 
 
2.10.1 Escalation Oriented Media Rhetoric & De-escalation Oriented Rhetoric 
Derived from the nature of escalation process, media’s escalation oriented rhetoric 
can be conceptualized as the art of attributing and transferring packaged meanings and 
specifying certain causes of conflict, which influence all parties in the cognitive 
framework as well as the impartial audience by limiting their cognitive choices; 
therefore triggering and strengthening the social-psychological changes leading to 
escalation. 
 
Conceptualization of de-escalation oriented rhetoric is derived from Kempf et.al.’s 
explanation of de-escalation oriented conflict coverage described as the analysis of 
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conflict  that investigates the causes and possible peaceful alternatives of conflict, which 
is marked by critical distance toward all conflict parties (Kempf et.al. ed., 2003).  
Therefore, de-escalation oriented rhetoric is the art of attributing and transferring 
positive meanings, specifying alternative solutions of conflict, and questioning the 
conflict process rather than judging it.  The difference between escalation oriented 
rhetoric and de-escalation oriented rhetoric is that the nature of de-escalation is not the 
major tool in order to build a de-escalation oriented rhetoric because rather than offering 
cognitive frameworks for de-escalation, first the media should eliminate escalation-
oriented rhetoric to have a de-escalation oriented rhetoric.  As Kempf suggests de-
escalation orientation for media is a primary step from seeing “them” as the problem and 
from focusing on the question of who will prevail in the fight (Kempf et.al. ed., 2003). 
 
In the next chapter of this study, the results of the content analysis of five 
newspapers in Turkey to identify whether the media rhetoric about the Armenian 
conference conflict  were escalation oriented or de-escalation oriented regarding their 
ideological positioning in the Turkish political context are represented. Being one of the 
major sources of communication and information, the media intervenes in conflict 
processes by offering cognitive frameworks by using various types of rhetoric.  In this 
sense, the news media may vary in selecting definitions and interpretations of problems 
in conflict processes while putting others aside.   
 
Before the data analysis, it should be stated that some results of the content 
analysis are expected.  Accordingly, the rhetoric of newspapers are not only affected by 
their ideological positions but also affected from the nature of conflict escalation.  Thus, 
the difference between the May and September period conflict phases are also 
influential in the rhetoric of newspapers.  On the other hand, the context of Turkey’s 
political space in 2005 includes many political events that are especially related to the 
EU accession talks as well as domestic problems.  Therefore, the attention of daily 
newspapers on the Armenian conference would be low.  The conflict escalation intensity 
in the Armenian conference issue is not as high as a war period, which means the 
attention paid by the media would be influenced by this fact. Lastly, the escalation-
oriented rhetoric of newspapers are expected to be higher since media are argued to be 
influenced by their ideological positioning in a related political context and acting as a 
secondary party in a conflict escalation,  in a related political context.  
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It should also be noted that the reason to conduct this study is not only to explore 
evidence that media are non-neutral in their rhetoric depending on their ideological 
positioning.  The main reason for such an exploration is to emphasize the role of media 
in conflict escalation processes and the need to develop a conflict environment with a 
conflict analysis and resolution perspective. Reljic suggest that  
 
 
   “If reports about tension and conflict are issued in a genuinely free and 
independent manner and presented in a fair and balanced way, they can indeed 
help to overcome conflict in that they will serve to educate the public, allowing 
their readers and listeners to form independent opinions. On the other hand, biased 
and manipulative reports can all too easily accelerate and intensify the crisis.” 
(Reljic, 2004). 
 
 
Thus, the members of media should be aware that although there are certain 
conditions for  them to use non-neutral rhetoric, the potential influence on the perception 
of the situation by the audience is to be considered while reporting and interpreting the 
news related to conflict processes.  Simply put, there is a need for quality journalism in 
the context of conflict situations.  Reljic defines quality journalism as “critical and 
analytical reportings”(2004), while Tunç defines quality journalism, by referring to 
Meyer’s quality model, as “balanced reporting on a responsible and fair approach to 
issue, and keeping the same distance from every political figure in power” (2003).  
However, when the Turkey’s media environment is under question, the approach of 
quality journalism is not considered by media.  That is why in the next chapter the 
question of how close the media are to an ideological position will be explored.  
However, after the link between media and the political environment is found out, the 
suggesstions for the development of a more analytical media are going to be made.  
Thus another reason of this study is to reach some suggesstions to improve the approach 
of media in conflict escalation processes by beginning with an analysis of the media 
context in Turkey in a conflict escalation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The conflict escalation over the ‘Armenian Conference’ emerged at the end of May 
2005 because the conference was originally planned to be held 25-27 May 2005 at 
Boğaziçi University. When the Minister of Justice of the time accused those associated 
with the conference of “treason” and “stabbing Turkey in the back,” the administration of 
Boğaziçi University announced the delay of the conference.   Accordingly, the conference 
was postponed to 24-25 September 2005 and convened, but in private Bilgi University, 
although the planned venue was Boğaziçi University, because of the order of 
Administrative Court of Istanbul.  In both the May period and September period media in 
Turkey were interested because there was a conflict escalating due to the controversy 
between various binary oppositions.  The parties in the conflict were introduced in the 
introduction chapter.  However, I prepared Table 3.1 in order to show the differences of 
the parties. 
PARTIES AGAINST 
CONVENING OF THE 
ARMENIAN CONFERENCE 
(Anti-conference)  
PARTIES WHO SUPPORT 
CONVENING OF THE 
ARMENIAN CONFERENCE 
(Pro-conference) 
Those defending the official discourse Those who supported the conference 
because of the fatigue of the official 
discourse 
Extreme nationalists Organizers of the Armenian 
conference 
Those not invited to the conference Conference participants 
 
Those against the European Union 
 
Those  supporting the accession of 
Turkey to the European Union 
 
 Those against the attempts to suspend 
the conference 
 Table 3.1 Parties to the conflict over the Armenian Conference 
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As in Table 3.1, there are four parties on the anti-conference side but five parties on 
the pro-conference side.  In particular, during the September period the parties categorized 
as those who were opposed to suspending the conference increased their voice because of 
the Court’s order.  However, in the May period, the parties against suspending the 
conference were the conference organizers and the parties, in the September period, 
people who do not have a direct relationship with the conference organization argued that 
the conference should be held because there is freedom of speech in Turkey.  
Simultaneously, the controversies between the adversaries were being discussed in the 
public media in Turkey, in particular, columnists were commenting on the Armenian 
conference.  The reason to include the controversy between EU supporters and the people 
against the EU is the context of 2005.  On 3 October 2005, the EU and Turkey were 
scheduled to meet to discuss the beginning of entry negotiations that would allow formal 
talks and screening processes of Turkish membership of the European Union.  According 
to some EU countries, there have been few developments within Turkey that have 
highlighted the paradoxes of the Turkish mindset on freedom of thought; thus the human 
rights issues.  Also, according to some EU countries, especially France, the Armenian 
issue was ignored and denied by Turkey for years.  When the negotiation talks were on the 
agenda in 2005, Orhan Pamuk gave an interview, in February 2005, stating that Turkey 
was responsible for the deaths of a million Armenians during WWI, but that nobody 
within the country dared speak about this genocide. For this reason a trial began about 
Pamuk’s comments in Turkey in 2005, gave rise to the discussions about the Armenian 
issue between the EU and Turkey.   As a result, the groups who have controversies about 
the EU negotiations began to discuss Turkey’s accession to the EU over the Armenian 
issue.  When the Armenian conference was postponed in May 2005, similar discussions 
appeared between EU supporters and those who were against the EU.   Since 3 October, 
the date for the entry talks was in the very near future, during the September period the 
opposition between EU supporters and those who were against the EU were claiming 
opposite ideas about the convening of the conference became more apparent.   
 
In order to give a clear picture of the newspapers’ interest on the Armenian 
conference, thus the conflict escalation between various groups, the frequency of the  
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arguments in each newspaper is analyzed.  In the second step the intensity of escalation-
oriented rhetoric and de-escalation-oriented rhetoric are analyzed for the May period and 
September period in order to search for a pattern in the rhetoric of newspapers by 
including the distribution of use categories by each newspaper.  The second coder of the 
content analysis is a student studying Media and Communication Systems at the Faculty 
of Communication at Bilgi University.  Inter-coder reliability for the analysis is 91% but 
the second coder of the data has coded five samples in total, one from each newspaper. 
Before beginning the analysis the categories of our coding frame it should kept in mind 
and the abbreviations for the categories are displayed in Table 3.2.  In addition, qualitative 
observations developed during the coding are included in the analysis of each newspaper.  
 
 
ESCALATION-
ORIENTED 
RHETORIC 
DE-ESCALATION-
ORIENTED RHETORIC 
E1 : Polarization: 
emphasis on the difference 
between "us" and "them" 
D1: Query of polarization 
E2: Zero-sum or 
win-lose orientation 
D2: Win-win orientation 
or existence of cooperation as a 
possibility 
E3: Attributing the 
causes of conflict to one 
group (destructive) 
D3: Attributing the cause 
of conflict to both groups and 
the context (constructive) 
Category 1: 
Conceptualization 
of the nature of 
conflict 
E4: Obstacles to 
conflict resolution are 
emphasized 
D4: Evaluation of 
resolution alternatives 
 
Category 2 
Evaluation of 
parties’ goals and 
objectives 
E5: Demonizing the 
opponent and denial of his 
goals and objectives 
D5: Respecting the 
opponent's rights and unbiased 
description of his goals and 
objectives 
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E6: Idealization of 
one group's goals and 
objectives 
D6: Self-critical evaluation 
of own goals and objectives 
Category 2 
Evaluation of 
parties’ goals and 
objectives 
(continued) 
E7: Denial of 
common interests, 
emphasis on 
incompatibility of interests 
D7: Emphasis on common 
interests or benefits both sides 
could gain by resolution of 
conflict 
E8: Justification of 
one's own side's actions 
D8: Self-critical evaluation 
of one's own side's actions 
E9: Condemnation of 
the opponent's actions 
D9: Balanced evaluation 
of both sides' actions 
Category 3: 
Evaluation of the 
parties' actions 
E10: Possibilities for 
cooperation are denied 
D10: Description and/or 
support for possibilities for 
cooperation 
E11: A focus on 
"their" dangerousness 
(threat) and "our" 
confidence promotes to 
engage in conflict 
D11: Emphasis on 
deconstructing the perception of 
threat from the "other" and our 
confidence will promote 
willingness for peace 
E12: Depicting the 
other party as 
untrustworthy 
D12: Evaluations of 
reasons to reduce mistrust 
Category 4: 
Emotional 
involvement 
in the conflict 
E13: Jeopardizing 
empathy through 
demonizing "their" 
intentions and/or justifying 
"our" behavior:  if they 
behave well they have 
nothing to fear 
D13: Empathy for "their" 
situation creates a new 
perspective: we can find 
solutions together that takes all 
sides' needs into account 
Table 3.2 Coding Frame with abbreviations of categories 
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Newspapers have different types of columns about current events, politics, 
economics, arts and culture, magazine and sports.  This paper, on the other hand, uses 
columns on current events, politics, and economics and excludes arts, culture, magazine 
and sports related columns because the conflict over the implementation of the Armenian 
conference is not related to cultural events, magazine news or sports.   
 
It is important to illustrate the frequency of the Armenian conference related 
arguments because the rhetoric of the whole newspaper will be judged through the use of 
columns.  Therefore, the proportion of the coded arguments to the total number of 
arguments in columns about politics, current events and economy in Özgür Gündem, 
Agos, Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, Yeniçağ and Vakit in the May and September periods would 
give the frequency of the coded arguments in the newspapers.  
 
Between the above-mentioned five newspapers, only Agos is a weekly newspaper.  
One of the problems in comparability is solved by coding the arguments rather than 
coding the columns with one category.  However, still there is a comparability problem 
because weekly newspapers attempt to write about the whole week’s socio-political 
discussions and when there was a conflict escalation about the Armenian conference 
which is analyzed as the most prominent issue of the week according to Agos, it can be 
discussed in more detail in Agos. 
 
3.1. AGOS 
 
Agos is a weekly newspaper published every Friday in Turkey since 1996.  There are 
six permanent columnists writing on socio-economic and socio-political context: Hrant 
Dink, Taner Akçam, Baskın Oran, Aydın Engin, Karin Karakaşlı.  The chief editor of 
Agos, Hrant Dink, was invited as a participant in the Armenian conference.  Therefore, the 
attention to the conflict over the Armenian conference by Agos is likely to be high. In 
total, there were 600 arguments in the May period while in the September period there 
were 450 arguments. The number of arguments in Agos is few since it is weekly 
newspaper.  In the May period, four columns were related to the Armenian conference, 
and in the September period, six columns covered the conflict over the Armenian  
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conference. Thus, percentages of the attention paid to the conflict over the Armenian 
conference by Agos are found as below: 
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Figure 3.1 Frequency of coded arguments in Agos weekly  
 
As illustrated in Figure 3.1 above, the frequency of conflict escalation about the 
Armenian conference arguments are 12% for May period, whereas 34,8% in the 
September period. The percentage of frequency reveals that Agos’ attention to the conflict 
escalation was high.  Considering the ideological position of Agos, high attention is a 
result of it being a newspaper addressing the Armenian minority in Turkey.  However, the 
increase in the frequency in the September period might be a result of the nature of 
conflict escalation in September since the period is most importantly influenced from the 
May period’s numerous discussions.  The number of discussions increased in the 
September period because the ideas of the May period were elaborated on again in the 
media.  Similarly, the increase of the frequency in the September period is seen in the 
analysis of other newspapers in the following sections of this chapter. 
 
Newspapers have different types of columns about current events, politics, 
economics, arts and culture, magazine and sports.  This paper, though, will use columns 
on current events, politics, and economics and exclude arts, culture, magazine and sports 
related columns because the conflict over the implementation of the Armenian conference 
is not related to cultural events, magazine news or sports.   
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It is important to illustrate the frequency of the Armenian conference related 
arguments because the rhetoric of the whole newspaper will be judged through the use of 
columns.  Therefore, the total number of arguments in columns about politics, current 
events and economy in Özgür Gündem, Agos, Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, Yeniçağ and Vakit 
newspapers are units of analysis that will give the frequency of the coded arguments in the 
newspapers. 
AGOS Proportions of escalation and de-escalation rhetoric in May and 
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Figure 3.2 AGOS - Percentage of escalation rhetoric and de-escalation in the 
May and September periods 
 
When we analyze the proportion of escalation and de-escalation rhetoric in the May 
and September periods, it is found that while escalation oriented rhetoric is 93% and de-
escalation oriented rhetoric is 6,9% in the May period; in the September period escalation 
oriented rhetoric is 78% and de-escalation oriented rhetoric is 21,6 %.  Thus, there is a 
significant change between May rhetoric and September rhetoric in Agos newspaper.  
Accordingly, there is a significant decrease in the escalation-oriented rhetoric of Agos 
newspaper and a rise in de-escalation-oriented rhetoric.  Agos has chosen to use more de-
escalation-oriented rhetoric in the September period.  One of the reasons for this choice 
may be the implication that in the May period the conference was postponed because, for 
example, the emphasis of the arguments was based on “understanding each other” in 
Agos.  
  
Agos used escalation-oriented arguments in both the May and September periods.  
For example, in the week of 27 May 2005, Baskın Oran dedicated his column “to ‘the  
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nationalists’ who should be ashamed” (aşağıdaki yazıyı utanması gereken 
milliyetçilerimize ithaf ediyorum), which is coded as E1 - emphasis on differences 
between ‘us’ and ‘them.’  Also, in the same week, Markar Esayan questioned the reasons 
of miscommunication and argued that “those who are against the dictated text of the 
official discourse are announced as traitors by the most competent authorities” (dikte 
edilen metin dışında görüşte olanlar, bizzat en yetkili merciler tarafından hain ilan 
ediliyorlar), which is coded as E9 - condemnation of opponent’s actions.  
 
On the other hand, during the week of 30 September, the arguments of Hrant Dink 
emphasized the de-escalation.  The title of Dink’s column was “Let’s First Understand 
Each Other” (Gelin önce birbirimizi anlayalım), which was coded as D4 - evaluation of 
resolution alternatives.  Also, Dink’s column included arguments coded by D2 - existence 
of cooperation as possibility - such as “the rapprochement of the adversaries is not 
impossible” (karşı tarafların birbirine yakınlaşmaları gayri mümkün hiç değil). 
 
Since the chief editor of Agos newspaper was one of the participants of the 
conference and the ideological position of Agos is on the conference supporters’ side, the 
increase in the de-escalation-oriented rhetoric of Agos in the September period can be the 
lessons learnt in the May period. That is to say, the delay of the conference in May and the 
high tension created by both sides caused a delay of the conference, however in the 
September period, the conference was convened and pro-conference parties achieved their 
goal; thus, there was no need for an escalation in tension for the pro-conference parties. 
 
Although the frequency and the distribution of escalation-oriented rhetoric and de-
escalation-oriented rhetoric is helpful to identify a certain attitude of a newspaper, the use 
of the categories in the coding frame is much more crucial to indicate an existence of a 
pattern in the rhetoric.  
 
In order to analyze how escalation-oriented rhetoric and de-escalation oriented 
rhetoric are used, I need to analyze the intensity of the use of categories in the coding 
frame.  Therefore, according to the data analysis, the intensity of the usage of escalation- 
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oriented rhetoric categories in May and September are not identical, but very similar in 
escalation-oriented rhetoric. 
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Figure 3.3 The graphic reveals Agos’ different usage of the rhetorical categories 
in the codebook by indicating the difference between the May and September 
rhetoric 
 
As it is apparent from the graph above, there is a difference between the amount of 
usage of one category, E13 - jeopardizing empathy.  In May, Category E13 – jeopardizing 
empathy through demonizing ‘their’ intensions and/or justifying ‘our’ behavior - is used 
two times in the September period, but never used in the  May period.  This is because 
even the idea of empathy was not often considered by the pro-conference parties in 
September.  However, this deviation is a slight difference when we consider the similar 
usage of each category in both May and September periods.   
 
The pro-conference parties in May stressed the unjust actions of the anti-conference 
parties.  Except for E13, there seems to be a pattern in the escalation rhetoric because first 
of all, category E6 - idealization of one groups’ goals and objectives - and category E9 - 
condemnation of opponent actions - are used to the maximum level in both periods.  For 
example, in May Aydın Engin stated “even before the beginning of the conference they 
‘boiled a witch’s cauldron’” (daha konferans başlamadan cadı kazanı kaynattılar), which 
means anti-conference parties presented the pro-conference parties as a threat; and 
“achieved their goals” (ve muratlarına erdiler). Both of the arguments of Aydın Engin are  
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coded as E9 - condemnation of the opponent’s actions.  Also the categories from E1 – 
polarization - to E11 -a focus on “their” dangerousness - are used a similar amount in both 
periods, which shows that there is a pattern of rhetoric. For example, when E3 - attributing 
the cause of conflict to one group – was used three times in May, the same category was 
used seven times in September, while category E10 - possibilities for cooperation are 
denied - and E11- a focus on ‘their’ dangerousness and ‘our’ confidence promote to 
engage in conflict -  are never used in these periods.  This means that Agos, although 
using an escalation-oriented rhetoric does not choose to emphasize an emotional 
involvement to the conflict, but chooses to underline the importance of evaluating the 
goals and actions of the anti-conference parties. 
 
As the above-mentioned results reveal, considering the ideological position of Agos, 
and identifying closer to the pro-conference parties, the goals of the conference 
supporters’ are idealized highly and the adversaries’ actions against the conference are 
presented as harming the idealized objectives of the conference supporters.  Simply put, 
the people against the conference are blamed and presented as the source of conflict, while 
conference supporters are presented as victims.  Actually, when we consider the 
ideological position of Agos newspaper in our ideological map, the result is not surprising 
and reveals that the position of a newspaper influences the rhetoric of a newspaper.   
 
As a second step, I also question if there is a pattern as such in the de-escalation 
rhetoric of Agos by analyzing the usage of de-escalation oriented rhetoric categories in 
September and May and Figure 2.4 analyzes the intensity of usage of categories on the 
next page. 
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AGOS - September and May period
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Figure 3.4 The intensity of usage of the de-escalation oriented rhetoric 
categories of the coding frame in Agos newspaper in September and May 
 
Different from the escalation-oriented rhetorical pattern, in the de-escalation-
oriented rhetoric, only categories that are used in a similar amount in the May and 
September periods are D3 - attributing the cause of conflict to both groups and the context 
- and D4 - evaluation of resolution alternatives.   Therefore, in the de-escalation-oriented 
pattern, Agos questions the existence of resolution alternatives and attributes the cause of 
conflict to the context in both periods. Agos’ ideological positioning favors the rise of 
different ethnic identity, which means in nature there is a critique of the political context 
and search for alternatives in general.  In the September period the variety in de-
escalation-oriented rhetoric is higher, which again can be attributed to the nature of the 
September period.   
 
On the other hand, a significant finding of the content analysis is that Agos weekly 
never applied D12 - evaluations of reasons to reduce mistrust - and D13 - empathy for 
‘their’ situation creates a new perspective - categories to their rhetoric.  This result can 
again be attributed to the ideological positioning of the newspaper.  Thus, being away 
from the center on the second dimension of our map; and being close to favoring the rise 
of different ethnic identities in the political context, Agos newspaper has a deeply rooted 
mistrust of the political context as well as the adversaries defending the official 
discourses.  This means building empathy with adversaries is not easy because empathy is  
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not seen as a tool to create a new perspective.  Similarly, the most used category E9 - 
condemnation of opponent actions - can also be explained by the unique position of Agos.  
Since Agos is a minority newspaper often criticizing the status quo in the political context, 
the actions of the adversaries believed to be supporting the status quo are criticized as 
well. 
 
3.2. CUMHURİYET 
 
As it was mentioned in the first chapter, Cumhuriyet is a left-wing, Kemalist daily 
that targets social-democratic intellectuals, which has a closer ideological position to the 
main opposition party in the parliament at the time in question. The average number of 
columns in Cumhuriyet is thirteen per day.  Columnists who contribute often in 
Cumhuriyet are Mustafa Balbay, Cüneyt Arcayürek, Oktay Akbal, Toktamış Ateş, Ali 
Sirmen, Hikmet Çetinkaya, Orhan Bursalı, Orhan Birgit, Yakup Kepenek, Bekir Coşkun, 
Oral Çalışlar, Bedri Baykam, İlhan Selçuk, Mümtaz Soysal, Emre Kongar, Deniz 
Kovukçuoğlu, Deniz Som and Nilgün Cerrahoğlu.  Also there are other columnists, who 
write once or twice every fifteen days.  
 
Cumhuriyet’s circulation between 23 and 29 May 2005 was 58,263 and 19-25 
September 2005 was 57,612. The total arguments in Cumhuriyet in the May period is 
6902 and in the September period 8222 arguments exist in the columns.  The number of 
arguments in Cumhuriyet is very high when we compare it with Agos because Cumhuriyet 
is a daily newspaper.  While 217 arguments in the May period are related to the conflict 
over the Armenian conference, in the September period 225 arguments are coded 
according to the categories in the coding frame.  Therefore, the attention paid by 
Cumhuriyet daily to conflict escalation over the Armenian conference is as below: 
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Figure 3.5 Frequency of coded arguments in Cumhuriyet daily 
 
Figure 3.5 displays the frequency of arguments on conflict escalation about the 
Armenian conference.  According to the graph, 3,13 % for the May period, whereas 
2,73% in the September period. The percentage of the frequency reveals that Cumhuriyet 
did not pay a considerable amount of attention to the conflict escalation of the Armenian 
conference in both periods. However, since it is a daily newspaper, Cumhuriyet is 
following a wide range of news, in the socio-political context, from domestic and 
international political affairs to economy.  Thus, it would be hard to expect all the 
columnists to dedicate their columns to one conflict issue. On the other hand, when the 
difference of frequency between the May and September periods is analyzed, the results in 
Cumhuriyet’s frequency depict the effect of the nature of the September period, which is 
not highly affected by the May period’s dynamics and arguments, as in Agos newspaper.  
On the other hand, as a result of being a daily, Cumhuriyet arguments in the September 
period were emphasizing more on Turkey and EU talks.  Since there are a lot of other 
social and political events to consider in Turkey’s accession to the EU and in the political 
context, the Armenian conference did not receive too much attention in the September 
period. 
 
However, the low frequency in Cumhuriyet about the Armenian conference above 
might be a result of including economy related columns in the content analysis.  Although 
there are columns related to economy discussing the Armenian conference, the number of 
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economy columns was few.  Therefore, the frequency, without including the economy 
related columns, should be analyzed.  
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Figure 3.6 Frequency without economy – related columns in Cumhuriyet daily 
 
As the figure above displays, the frequency in May rose to 3,74% and 3,16% in the 
September period.  Although the frequencies are still low in both periods for Cumhuriyet, 
the effect of excluding the economy related columns are apparent.   
 
In addition, the proportion of escalation to de-escalation-oriented rhetoric can be 
displayed as below: 
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Figure 3.7 Comparing May and September period’s distribution of rhetoric 
according to being escalation-oriented and de-escalation oriented 
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Figure 3.7 displays that in the May period escalation-oriented rhetoric of 
Cumhuriyet newspaper is 72,3%, while de-escalation oriented rhetoric is 27,6%.  In the 
September period, on the other hand, Cumhuriyet focused of escalation-oriented rhetoric 
with 78,2%, while de-escalation oriented rhetoric decreased to 21,7%. The change in 
Cumhuriyet’s rhetoric between the two periods is 5,9%. Thus, when we consider 
Cumhuriyet’s ideological position, the rise of the escalation-oriented rhetoric in the 
September period can be attributed to its place, especially on the second dimension, which 
is closer to Turkish nationalism on the second dimension in the ideological map that 
means more possibility to support the official discourse supporters.  However, although 
Cumhuriyet has an escalation-orientated rhetoric, “the other” of each columnist is 
different. For example, while Bedri Baykam and Oktay Akbal are on the anti-conference 
side because they thought the aim of the conference was one-sided, Deniz Kavukçuoğlu 
and Oral Çalışlar are supporting pro-conference parties.  On the other hand, Toktamış 
Ateş criticized the aim and the organization of the conference, but suppored the convening 
of the Armenian conference.  Thus, the escalation-oriented rhetoric is not against one side, 
but the supported parties differ depending on the columnist.  Although, some can argue 
that the variety in the rhetoric of the columnists is proving that there is not an influence of 
the ideological position, the variety of the columnists attempt to balance the controversies 
between the adversaries and attributing the cause of the conflict to the political authorities. 
No de-escalatory rhetoric about the objectives of one group or the actions of the opponent 
is used.  The de-escalation-oriented rhetorical pattern of Cumhuriyet newspaper indicates 
that even using the de-escalation-oriented rhetoric categories, the ideological position 
affects which category to use without emphasizing the possibilities for self-critical 
evaluation of one sides’ goals and actions or common interests or cooperation of the 
adversaries.  Therefore, due to the attempt by Cumhuriyet to give both parties’ arguments 
a balanced viewpoint in the newspaper, the ideological position is highly effective.  Since 
Cumhuriyet  is close to the main opposition party in the parliament, acting to criticize the 
status quo is a result of its ideological position. Thus, especially in the May period, 
Cumhuriyet supported more the pro-conference parties because the speech by the Minister 
of Justice was highly criticized. Thus, although Cumhuriyet is close to the nationalist end 
of the second dimension, it is away from the center-right on the first dimension.  In  
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addition, it is targeting the intellectuals, which means extreme nationalists as well as the 
political authority are criticized.  Therefore, it is possible to argue that the ideological 
position influences the type of rhetoric used by newspapers.  
 
In order to analyze how escalation-oriented rhetoric and de-escalation oriented 
rhetoric are used by Cumhuriyet newspaper and elaborate on the existence of a pattern in 
rhetoric, I need to analyze the intensity of the use of categories in the coding frame for 
Cumhuriyet as well.  As a result, it can be decided whether the ideological position 
influences the rhetorical pattern. 
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Figure 3.8 The intensity of usage of the de-escalation oriented rhetoric 
categories of the coding frame in Cumhuriyet  newspaper in September and May 
 
In Cumhuriyet’s escalation-oriented rhetoric, there is certainly a pattern when I 
compare the May period and the September period. The amount of usage of E2 - zero-sum 
orientation, E5 - denial of the opponent’s goals and objectives, E8 - justification of one 
side’s actions, E9 - condemnation of the opponent’s action, E11 - a focus on “their” 
dangerousness and “our” confidence, E12 - depicting the other party as untrustworthy and 
E13 - jeopardizing empathy, are very close to each other.  On the other hand, category 
E10 - possibilities for cooperation are denied - is never used in either period.  The 
deviances in categories E1 -  polarization, E6 - idealization of one’ own group and E7 - 
denial of common interests are probably because of the more frequent escalation oriented  
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rhetoric in the September period in comparison to the May period. While E3, E4 and E9 
were applied more in the May period, they were applied less in the September period.     
  
According to the ideological map, the position of Cumhuriyet is closer to the 
nationalist end of the second dimension and away from the center right on the first 
dimension. In the May period the use of E3 - attributing the cause of conflict to one group, 
E4 - obstacles to conflict resolution - are emphasized to conceptualize the conflict, and E9 
- demonizing the opponent’s actions - are in parallel with the attitude of the both parties.  
For example, while Hikmet Çetinkaya, on 26 May 2005, states that “according to them 
Turks cut off the Armenians in Anatolia” (onlara göre Türkler Anadolu’da Ermenileri 
kesmişlerdi).  The statement of Hikmet Çetinkaya is coded as E5 - demonizing the 
opponent, denial of his goals and objectives - where the opponent in his arguments are 
pro-conference side.  On the other hand, for example, Deni Kavukçuoğlu argues “the 
prohibitives are doing wrong” (yasakçılar bir yanlışa düşüyorlar) which is coded as E1 – 
emphasis between “us” and “them” - where the opponent is against the conference.  
Although this argument can also be coded as E9 -condemnation of opponent’s actions, the 
emphasis throughout the paragraph is on polarization.    However, it must be noted that 
Deniz Kavukçuoğlu changes her opponent and balances the arguments against each 
adversary throughout her articles.  Many columnists follow the same way and end up 
criticizing the political authority such as in Oral Çalışlar’s column, on 27 May 2005, 
which only questions the political ideas of the Minister of Justice and his speech about the 
Armenian conference.   
 
Similarly, in the September period, the use of E7 - denial of common interests , E6 – 
idealization of one group’s goals and objectives, and E1 - emphasis on the difference 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’- suggest that Cumhuriyet is prone to defend both parties against 
in the September period because neither the opponent nor their own side while using E7, 
E6 and E1 are clear in the rhetoric but apparently the acts of the government members and 
structural issues are criticized by referring to the Court’s decision of suspension of the 
Armenian conference in September. 
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On the other hand, as Figure 3.9 below indicates, in terms of de-escalation oriented 
rhetoric, Cumhuriyet has a pattern, too.  However, only in categories D1 - query of 
polarization, D4 - evaluation of resolution alternatives, D11 - emphasis on deconstructing 
the perception of threat and D13 - empathy for their situation - are considerably higher in 
the May period.  The ideological position of Cumhuriyet is closer to the nationalist end of 
the second dimension and away from the center right on the first dimension, thus there is 
an attempt to balance the conflicting parties’ arguments while criticizing the government. 
  
When the conference was postponed in May, the de-escalation-oriented rhetoric was 
high so was the conceptualization of the conflict and the emotional involvement to the 
conflict was emphasized by de-escalation oriented rhetoric.  On the one hand, being away 
from the center-right causes Cumhuriyet to criticize the government members who are 
against the conference, thus Cumhuriyet presents itself partially supporting the pro-
conference side.  On the other hand, on the second dimension, Cumhuriyet is closer to the 
nationalist end, which makes Cumhuriyet columnists support the ideas of the anti-
conference parties.  
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Figure 3.9 The intensity of usage of the de-escalation oriented rhetoric 
categories of the coding frame in Cumhuriyet newspaper in September and May 
 
          In sum, Cumhuriyet has a certain escalation-oriented rhetorical pattern 
depending on its ideological positioning and also has a certain de-escalation pattern 
according to its position in the political context.  
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3.3 HÜRRİYET 
 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, Hürriyet is situated at the center-right in the 
ideological map representing the political context of Turkey.   The average number of 
columnists in Hürriyet is thirteen.  The columnists who often covered the conflict 
escalation over the Armenian conference in their columns are Emin Çölaşan, Hadi 
Uluengin, Oktay Ekşi, Yalçın Doğan, Murat Bardakçı, Ertuğrul Özkök, Özdemir İnce and 
Ferai Tınç.   The circulation of Hürriyet between 23-29 May 2005 was 497,981 and 
between 19-25 September 2005 was 531,788. 
 
While in the May period there were 10,803 arguments, in the September period the 
total number of arguments was 9703. In most of the arguments about the Armenian 
conference, Hürriyet columnists perceived themselves as those against the conference, 
thus the opponents were the pro-conference parties. Oktay Ekşi, on 27 May 2005 
criticized the conference organizers by defining them as “you, who say Armenian 
genocide is truth” (Ermeni soykırımı gerçektir diyen sizler..), and differentiating himself 
from the conference organizers, coded as E1 - polarization, clearly indicates that he is 
supporting the anti-conference arguments. Another example can be given from Emin 
Çölaşan’s column on 27 September 2005.  Emin Çölaşan emphasized “the other” as the 
conference organizers and interpreted the convening of the Armenian conference in 
September by arguing that “this time their speed was lowered” (bu sefer hızları biraz 
kesilmişti), coded as E1 - emphasizing “them.”  
 
On the other hand, the attention to conflict escalation over the Armenian conference 
of Hürriyet is illustrated below:  
 
 
 68 
Hürriyet Frequency
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50
3,00
Hürriyet
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f c
o
v
er
ag
e
 
%
May Period
September Period
 
Figure 3.10 Frequency of coded arguments in Hürriyet daily 
 
Figure 3.10 displays the frequency of arguments on conflict escalation about the 
Armenian conference.  According to the graph, 2,74% frequency for the May period, 
whereas 2,70% in the September period. The percentage of the frequency reveals that 
Hürriyet did not pay high attention to the conflict escalation in either period.  Although 
the frequency is low, similar to Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet is a daily newspaper covering a 
wide range of news that did not cover the Armenian issue in all of its columns.  When the 
differences of the frequencies between the May and the September periods are analyzed it 
is found that there is an decrease in frequency by 0,04% in the September period.  
However, an increase of 0,04% is definitely not an important difference.  Therefore, as a 
center-right newspaper Hürriyet is consistent with its amount of coverage in both periods.  
When we do not consider the arguments in economy columns, the frequency in May rose 
to 3,07% and 3,88% in the September period, which caused a rise by 0,33% for the May 
period and 1,18% for the September period.  Thus, not considering economy related 
arguments changes the frequencies in Hürriyet, but not a considerable amount.  
 
Additionally, the intensity of escalation and de-escalation-oriented rhetoric are also 
approximately the same in the May and September periods and can be displayed as below: 
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Hürriyet Intensity of Escalation and De-escalation-oriented rhetoric in May and September Period
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Figure 3.11 Comparing May and September period’s distribution of rhetoric 
according to being escalation-oriented and de-escalation oriented in Hürriyet 
 
Figure 3.11 above displays that in the May period escalation-oriented of Hürriyet is 
86,95% while de-escalation oriented rhetoric is 13,04%.  In the September period, on the 
other hand, Hürriyet focused more on de-escalation-oriented rhetoric with 16,7%, while 
escalation oriented rhetoric decreased to 83,2%. There is an increase in Hürriyet’s de-
escalation-oriented rhetoric in the September period by 3,75%, which is not an apparent 
change.   
 
Since Hürriyet is a newspaper at the center of the spatial map, the ideological 
position of the newspaper is shaped without being close to the ends of both dimensions of 
the Turkish ideological context.  The reason for the rise in the de-escalation rhetoric, 3%, 
in the September period is a result of the government member’s, such as the Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, statements about the right to organize such a 
meeting in Turkey.  Thus, it can be argued that the newspapers at the center are more 
prone to be in parallel with the official interpretations of conflict and the rise in the de-
escalation- oriented rhetoric of Hürriyet in the September period can be attributed to 
statements of the government members.  
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Figure 3.12 The intensity of usage of the escalation oriented rhetoric categories 
in Hürriyet newspaper in the September and May periods 
 
From the analysis in Figure 3.12, there is a clear pattern in Hürriyet newspaper’s 
usage of escalation rhetoric except the categories of  E6 - idealization of one group’s goals 
and objectives and E7 - denial of common interests, which were used less in the May 
period and used more in the September period. Categories E5 - demonizing the opponent 
and denial of his goals and objectives and E9 - condemnation of the opponent’s actions 
are used more often than the other categories in both periods.  For example, on 29 May, 
Murat Bardakçı in his column argues that “they are busy giving press ethic lessons to their 
environment” (onlar etrafa basın etiği dersleri vermekle meşguller), which is coded as E9 
- condemnation of opponent’s actions.  In addition, on 27 May, Emin Çölaşan argues that 
“they are going to work on the ‘genocide happened’ and ‘we cut off the Armenians’ 
thesis” (‘soykırım olmuştur,’,‘ermenileri kestik’ tezini işleyecekler), which is coded as E5 
- demonizing the opponent and denial of his goals and objectives.  
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Figure 3.13 The intensity of usage of the de-escalation oriented rhetoric 
categories in Hürriyet newspaper in the September and May periods 
 
On the other hand, as Figure 3.13 reveals, de-escalation oriented rhetoric patterns 
can be said to exist in between categories D4 to D10.  D10 - description or possibilities for 
cooperation, and D13 - empathy for ‘their’ intention creates a new perspective, are never 
used in either period.  This is because the power to defend a centralist view often does not 
lead to an aim of change. However, the status-quo is criticized by using the D9 - balanced 
evaluations of both sides’ actions, most often in the September period, and by using D3 - 
attributing the cause of conflict to both parties and the context - at the maximum level in 
the May period.   For example on 26 May, Oktay Ekşi defined the situation by stating that 
“the conference was not convened as a result of Turkey’s underdeveloped democracy” 
(Türkiye’nin yeterince demokratikleşmiş olmaması yüzünden yapılamayan toplantı..).  
Thus, having more of a centralist view Hürriyet criticizes the actions and the context but 
these critiques are very limited. Hürriyet does not search for the resolution alternatives, or 
emphasize the possibility for cooperation.  Since the newspaper is not close to the ends of 
the dimensions at the estimated political map, there is no reason for it to attempt to 
identify alternatives because centralist views often perceive themselves to have a stable 
point at the political context without deepening the discussions and defending the status 
quo.  
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3.4 VAKİT 
 
 
Vakit defined as an Islamic fundamentalist daily and placed at the pro-Islamist end 
of the first dimension and close to the center on the second dimension. This ideological 
position of Vakit means that when there are Islam-related discussions Vakit moves far 
away from the center-right, however, except for Islam-related discussions, the rhetoric of 
the newspaper is situated closer to the center.   The average number of columnists in Vakit 
newspaper is eleven. There were 10,092 arguments in the May period and 10,890 
arguments in the September period. There are only three columnists who have written 
about the Armenian conference in their columns and they are Abdurrahman Dilipak, 
Selahaddin Çakır and Abdurrahim Karakoç. Between 23-29 May 2005 Vakit’s circulation 
was 67,543 while 69,142 between 19-25 September 2005. 
 
However, not very similar to the newspapers elaborated until now, the attention paid 
to the issue of conflict escalation about the Armenian conference is too low in the Vakit 
newspaper. While in May the frequency is 0,15%, in September the frequency increases 
so insignificantly to 0,34 % as shown in Figure 3.14 in the next page. 
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Figure 3.14 Frequency of coded arguments in Vakit daily 
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When we exclude the economy related arguments in Vakit newspaper, the 
frequencies in the May and September periods rises by 0,25% in May and 0,18% in 
September.  These differences are not considerable.  The reasons for the very low change 
when economy related arguments are excluded is because Vakit newspaper’s columnists 
do not often write about economy, but emphasize the socio-political dynamics of Turkey’ 
s political context. 
 
In order to compare the intensity of escalation and de-escalation rhetorics, there is no 
need to draw a proportional graphic since the frequency is too low. However, it can be 
indicated that Vakit daily has used categories of E1, E6, E9, D3 and in total 17 escalation-
oriented categories and 1 de-escalation oriented categories in the May period; on the other 
hand, in the September period E1, E3, E4, E5, E6, E8, E9 categories are used and in total 
36 escalation-oriented rhetoric categories have been used, while in total 6 de-escalation 
oriented categories, including D3 and D4 have been used.  Although the frequency is so 
insignificant to identify a certain escalation-oriented or de-escalation-oriented rhetorical 
pattern, the intensity of escalation-oriented and de-escalation oriented categories are 
shown in Figure 3.15 and 3.16. 
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Figure 3.15 Vakit Distribution of Escalation Categories 
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Figure 3.16 Vakit Distribution of De-Escalation Categories 
 
All of the results of the data analysis indicate that the newspapers having a position 
closer to the pro-Islamist end of the first dimension are paying nearly no attention to an 
issue like the Armenian conflict.  Indeed, it can be said that the newspapers closer to the 
pro-Islamist end are more likely to pay attention to a conflict related to a religion-based 
conflict.  It can be even said that the newspapers closer to the pro-Islamist end specialize 
in discussing the religion based disagreements as well as religious narratives.  Therefore, 
Vakit is a very crucial example to argue that the ideological position of newspapers 
influence the rhetorical pattern of a medium with its lowest frequency.  
 
 
3.5 YENİÇAĞ 
 
 
 Yeniçağ, in the introduction was defined as a daily reflecting the views of hard-line 
nationalists inside the Nationalist Action Party. The average number of columnists is 
thirteen, and the columnists who often wrote about the Armenian conference are Lale 
Şıvgın, İsrafil K.Kumbasar, Arslan Tekin, Durmuş Hocaoğlu, Mustafa E.Erkal and Özcan 
Yeniçeri. The circulation numbers of Yeniçağ were 57,044 between 23-29 May and 56,  
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270 between 19 and 25 September 2005.  The total number of arguments in the May 
period is 7259 and the total number of arguments in the September period is 6366. The 
arguments of Yeniçağ in both periods supported the parties on the anti-conference side and 
were against the pro-conference parties. Being nearest to the Turkish nationalist end of the 
second dimension, the frequency analysis of Yeniçağ daily shows that the attention paid to 
the conflict escalation about Armenian conference is more than the other dailies in 
question.  
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         Figure 3.17 Yeniçağ Frequencies 
 
According to the figure above, in May the frequency of the related arguments in 
Yeniçağ is 3,43%, while in the September period the frequency insignificantly increases to 
3,97%.  On the other hand, the intensity of escalation and de-escalation oriented rhetoric 
for the May period and September period can be illustrated as below, which displays the 
main rhetorical pattern of Yeniçağ as escalation-oriented.  This can be the result of 
Yeniçağ’s ideological positioning because the conflict escalation about the Armenian 
conference is much more related to the discussion between Turkish nationalists and the 
groups favoring the rise of different ethnic identity than the discussion between secularists 
and pro-Islamists. Since Yeniçağ is the closest to the Turkish nationalist end of the second 
dimension in the estimated map, it defends the position of the groups against the 
conference but with a high emphasis to the threat of the opponent to Turkish identity.  
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Yeniçağ Intensity of Escalation Oriented and De-escalation Oriented Rhetoric
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Figure 3.18 Comparing May and September period’s distribution of rhetoric 
according to being escalation-oriented and de-escalation oriented in Yeniçağ 
 
According to the distribution of escalation-oriented rhetoric categories, Yeniçağ 
definitely follows a pattern except for the deviances in categories E2, E3 and E13 as 
displayed below: 
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Figure 3.19 The intensity of usage of the escalation oriented rhetoric categories 
in Yeniçağ newspaper in the September and May periods 
 
 Being closest to the Turkish nationalist end of the second dimension, Yeniçağ used 
E5 - demonizing the opponent and denial of his goals and objectives and E9 - 
condemnation of opponents actions - the most.  On the other hand E4 - obstacles to 
conflict resolution are emphasized and E10 - possibilities for cooperation are denied - are  
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nearly never used.  Yeniçağ has the harshest rhetoric in terms of quality, the use of the 
words were sharper and more severe when we compare the rhetoric of other newspapers.  
For example of the conference organizers are defined as “Tashnak Committee” (Taşnakçı 
Komite), which was a committee defending the rights of the Armenian factions inside 
Turkey at the time of the war of liberation in 1920s or “traitors”(hainler).  Thus, the 
reasons for the conflict are attributed to one side through the negative impressions of the 
past.  Also, the conference was defined as  ‘Turks cut off the Armenians’ conference” or 
“traitors meetings.”  On 27 May Arslan Tekin argues that “the organizers were going to 
complain about Turkey” (Türkiye’yi şikayet edeceklerdi) and uses E5 - demonize the 
opponent’s goals.   Often the columnists were analyzing each organizer’s life history and 
pointing out that they might be coming from different ethnicities and originally might not 
be Turkish. For example, İsrafil K. Kumbasar, on 24 May, specifically mentions two 
organizers, and emphasized that “there are assertions that those organizers are not coming 
from Turkish origin” (Türk asıllı olmadıkları yolunda iddialar var!” In addition, the 
quantitative results reveal that blaming the other is at its highest point in Yeniçağ’s 
rhetoric, while cooperation and conflict resolution are not mentioned even in an 
escalation-oriented rhetoric.  
 
De-escalation rhetoric has a very insignificant part in the rhetoric of Yeniçağ daily.  
Indeed, Yeniçağ is the only newspaper which used such a low amount of de-escalation- 
oriented categories.  The distribution of categories can be illustrated as below: 
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Figure 3.20 The intensity of usage of the de- escalation oriented rhetoric 
categories in Yeniçağ newspaper in the September and May periods 
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As it is apparent in Graph 18, D5 – respecting the opponent’s rights - is used the 
most, but the maximum usage is five times per period.  This situation is a result of 
Yeniçağ’s ideological position, which is shaped by hard-line nationalists.  
 
 
3.6 COMPARATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
 In this section, the crucial results of the data analysis are summarized by 
comparing the frequencies, amount of escalation oriented and de-escalation oriented 
rhetorics of the newspapers in question, and usage of escalation oriented and de-escalation 
oriented categories by the related newspapers.  
 
3.6.1. Comparing the Frequencies 
 Although, it was expected to find a high newspaper influence over the conflict 
about Armenian conference, except for the frequency of Agos, the other four newspapers 
Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, Vakit and Yeniçağ, did not pay high attention to the conflict.  The 
low frequency might be a result of scrutinizing the columns and leaving the other sections 
of news aside.  However, it is assumed that interpretation and ideological position of 
conflict can clearly be understood from the columns and other parts of the newspapers 
often do not interpret the news.    
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Figure 3.21 Frequency comparison of five newspapers in question 
 
The graph above indicates that the newspapers such as Agos and Yeniçağ that are 
closer to the end of the second dimension in the spatial map are more prone to devote their 
rhetoric to the Armenian conference.  However, Agos is the only newspaper which paid 
the highest attention to the Armenian conference because it is the only minority 
newspaper in the five newspapers in question.  Moreover, Agos is targeting the Armenian 
society in Turkey.  On the other hand, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet, closer to the center on 
the second dimension, did not pay a considerable attention to the issue.  Yeniçağ as a daily 
has the highest frequency as the closest newspaper to the nationalist right.  In addition 
Vakit’s attention to the issue is too low, while Cumhuriyet’s attention is closer to 
Hürriyet’s frequency.  Therefore, when we consider the first dimension that reveals the 
discussion between secularist-left and pro-Islamist right in the estimated political context, 
it can be argued that having a position to the pro-Islamist end does not affect the rhetoric 
of the newspaper when the issue of conflict escalation is about the Armenian conference.  
Cumhuriyet and Vakit are the newspapers closest to the ends of the first dimension in our 
estimated map.  While Cumhuriyet is a left-wing Kemalist daily targeting social 
intellectuals, Vakit is defined as an Islamic fundamentalist daily.  So, Cumhuriyet and  
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Vakit differentiate themselves from the center of the dimension.  Cumhuriyet differentiates 
itself by targeting social intellectuals and emphasizing Kemalism on the first dimension.  
However, when we analyze the place of Cumhuriyet on the second dimension it is more 
closer to the nationalist right than Hürriyet. Therefore, when we move on the second 
dimension and arrange the newspapers according to their frequency it is definite that 
newspapers closer to the ends of the second dimension in the spatial map are more prone 
to devote their rhetoric to the Armenian conference. 
 
3.6.2 Comparing the Intensity of Escalation-oriented Rhetorics 
 
In order to enumerate the newspapers according to their escalation orientation, the 
average percentage of the September and May periods are calculated.  At the end a figure 
is obtained that shows the intensity of escalation-oriented rhetoric in relation to the 
ideological positions of the newspapers. 
 
Intensity of Escalation-oriented Rhetoric in May and september periods
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Figure 3.22 The amounts of usage of escalation oriented rhetoric in related 
newspapers 
 
According to Figure 3.22, Agos’s average escalation-oriented rhetoric was 85,6 %, 
Cumhuriyet’s average escalation-oriented rhetoric was 75,3 %, Hürriyet’s average 
escalation-oriented rhetoric was 85 %, Vakit’s average escalation-oriented rhetoric was 90  
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%,  Yeniçağ’s average escalation-oriented rhetoric was 98,1%.  If these values are put on 
the ideological map the result appears as in Figure 3.23. 
 
Figure 3.23 Evaluating the escalation-oriented rhetoric of newspaper in relation to 
their ideological positions 
 
According to Figure 3.23, it is discovered that the newspapers that are closer to the 
ends of the second dimension have a more escalation oriented rhetoric.   However, the 
highest intensity of escalation-oriented rhetoric can be found at the nationalist right end of 
the second dimension.  On the other hand, newspapers that are closer to the center apply 
lesser amounts of escalation-oriented rhetoric than those closer to the ends of the second 
dimension.  When the percentages are questioned, Vakit’s high average frequency is 
deceiving because only fifty-three arguments are coded as escalation-oriented while there 
are sixty arguments in total related to the Armenian conference.  Since the data from Vakit 
newspaper is not enough, its rhetoric can not be evaluated reasonably.  
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3.6.3 Comparing the Intensity of De-escalation-oriented Rhetoric 
Although the intensity of de-escalation-oriented rhetoric can be extracted from the 
escalation-oriented rhetoric it is better to illustrate the picture of the intensity of de-
escalation oriented rhetoric in order to calculate the average amount of the usage of de-
escalation-oriented rhetoric.   
 
According to Figure 3.24, Agos’s average de-escalation-oriented rhetoric was 14,2 
%, Cumhuriyet’s average de-escalation-oriented rhetoric was 24,6 %, Hürriyet’s average 
de-escalation-oriented rhetoric was 14,8 %, Vakit’s average de-escalation-oriented 
rhetoric was 13,6 %,  Yeniçağ’s average de-escalation-oriented rhetoric was 1,8 %.  
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Figure 3.24 The amounts of usage of de-escalation oriented rhetoric in related 
newspapers 
 
If the above-mentioned average values of de-escalation oriented rhetoric are put on 
the ideological map the result appears as in Figure 3.25 on the next page: 
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Figure 3.25 Evaluating the escalation-oriented rhetoric of newspaper in relation 
to their ideological positions 
 
Accordingly, the newspapers closer to the center on the second dimension of the 
map use more de-escalation oriented rhetoric such as Cumnuriyet and Hürriyet (Vakit’s 
frequency is not significant enough to make an interpretation).  On the other hand 
newspapers closer to the ends of the second dimension use less de-escalation oriented 
rhetoric such as Agos and Yeniçağ.  In addition, the lowest de-escalation oriented rhetoric 
usage can be seen by moving to the nationalist end of the dimension.   
 
Since Cumhuriyet as being secularist-left targets the social democratic intellectuals 
and criticizing the government, in a conflict escalation related to the Armenian conference 
Cumhuriyet used the highest de-escalation rhetoric. According to Cumhuriyet the main 
argument was the right to convene an academic conference but without being one-sided as 
the conference organizers did. On the one hand, Cumhuriyet was criticizing the level of 
democracy and understanding of the government members, but on the other hand  
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Cumhuriyet  supported the anti-conference ideals and emphasized the right of those who 
were against the conference balanced it by addressing democratic intellectuals who were 
more prone to question the sources of conflict escalation and respecting the right of both 
parties in the period of escalation.  Thus, the attempt of Cumhuriyet to have a balanced 
evaluation of both sides resulted in 24,6% de-escalation rhetoric, which actually is a result 
of its ideological position. 
 
3.6.4. Comparing the Usage of Rhetoric Categories by Newspapers in Question 
 
Comparing the escalation- oriented rhetoric categories, the patterns in the May 
period and the September period, I have to analyze the most used escalation oriented 
categories that can be found for each newspaper and interpreted accordingly.      
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Figure 3.26 Usage of escalation oriented rhetoric categories in the May period
     
Distribution of escalation-oriented rhetoric categories in September
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Figure 3.27 Usage of escalation oriented rhetoric categories in the September 
period 
 
According to Figure 3.26 and 3.27, it is apparent that category E9 - condemnation of 
the opponent’s actions - is used most by all newspapers.  However, it should be kept in  
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mind that the opponents of all newspapers are not for all.  For example, while Agos 
perceives the opponent as the ones against the Armenian conference, Yeniçağ describes 
the opponent as the conference organizers and supporters.  In any case, E9 is used by all 
newspapers in their escalation rhetoric.  
 
On the other hand, for Agos’ usage of E6 - idealization of one group’s own goals and 
objectives - is also frequent in both periods.  Agos emphasizes the pro-conference side 
often  by arguing that conference supporters are the ones who respect democracy and wish 
for a flourishing democracy; thus, actually in comparison to anti-conference parties, pro-
conference parties present themselves as more democratic.  According to the pro-
conference parties, if the conference could be convened, the democracy level of Turkey 
would pass a threshold and develop more.  Therefore, the emphasis was not only on 
demonizing the opponent’s actions but also on pro-conference parties’ idealization of their 
own group’s goals and objectives.  Since Agos is closer to the conference supporters’ side 
usage of ‘idealizing own group’s goals’ rhetoric proves once more the existence of a link 
between the ideological position and rhetoric of a newspaper.  
 
In addition, category E5 - demonizing the opponent and denial of his goals and 
objectives - is often used by Yeniçağ and Hürriyet in both periods and also by Cumhuriyet 
in the September period.  As mentioned before, Yeniçağ, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet are 
closer to the nationalist right of the second dimension and often describe the opponent as 
the conference organizers and supporters.  Since conference organizers and supporters 
were emphasizing their own group’s objectives and goals, anti-conference parties 
appeared to be the people at the nationalist right wing blaming the opponent’s emphasis 
on the objectives of the conference.  That is why Yeniçağ, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet often 
used ‘demonizing the opponent rhetoric’ in their arguments.  
 
As a last step, usages of de-escalation categories are scrutinized to clearly indicate 
the link between the ideological position of newspapers and their rhetoric.  However, as it 
was mentioned in the first part of this chapter, de-escalation oriented rhetoric do not have 
as clear a pattern as escalation-oriented rhetoric.  Therefore, only very significant usages 
of some de-escalation categories in both periods are interpreted in the last section.  
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In comparing the escalation-oriented rhetoric categories, I look at the patterns in the 
May period and the September period.   
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Figure 3.28 Usage of de-escalation oriented rhetoric categories in the May 
period 
  
September de-escalation
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 Figure 3.29 Usage of de-escalation oriented rhetoric categories in the 
September period 
 
As Figure 3.29 shows, the most used de-escalation-oriented rhetoric category was 
D5 -respecting the opponents rights - in the May period.  While Cumhuriyet used D5 
mostly, Hürriyet and Yeniçağ newspapers also used D5 a significant amount.  The reason 
for Cumhuriyet can be explained by its address to the democratic intellectuals who would 
like to respect any parties’ rights in the conflict.  On the other hand, in the May period the 
reason for Yeniçağ and Hürriyet to use category D5 can be attributed to the outcome of 
the discussions over the conference.  When the Armenian conference was postponed, the 
groups who were against the conference achieved their goals and attempted to decrease  
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the tension by referring to the rights of their opponents because the result was in their 
interest.  Therefore, again being closer to the nationalist right, thus being closer to the 
groups of people who are against the conference, Hürriyet and Yeniçağ used D5.  
 
In the September period, Hürriyet used D9 - balanced evaluation of both sides’ 
actions - because the second attempt to suspend the conference was not welcomed by the 
majority of the public and by the officials. Hürriyet is described as a center-right mass 
appeal daily that often responds to the common rhetoric of the public. That is why it 
began to use D9 in the September period, which resulted in a self critical evaluation of 
own side’s actions as well as criticizing the opponent.   
 
Lastly, Agos in the September period often used D10 - description or support for 
possibilities for cooperation.  Therefore, similar to the attitude of Yeniçağ, Hürriyet and 
Cumhuriyet, after its own side achieved the goal, the rhetoric of Agos began to be prone to 
decrease the tension by referring to cooperation.   
 
From all these results, it can be concluded that there is a link between the media 
rhetoric and their ideological positioning in Turkey.  According to their ideological 
positions, newspapers have various patterns of escalation and de-escalation rhetoric in the 
conflict escalation in September and May 2005 over convening a conference entitled 
“Ottoman Armenians During the Decline of the Empire: Issues of Scientific 
Responsibility and Democracy.”  Moreover, the newspapers that are closer to the ends of 
the second dimension have a more escalation oriented rhetoric.   However, the highest 
intensity of escalation-oriented rhetoric can be found at the nationalist right end of the 
second dimension.  On the other hand, newspapers that are closer to the center on the 
second dimension apply lesser amount of escalation-oriented rhetoric than those closer to 
the ends of the dimension.  However, the insignificant results obtained from Vakit 
newspaper suggest that the first dimension is not as important as the second dimension of 
the estimated map for the Armenian conference conflict escalation.  Yet, in another 
conflict escalation subject it might be better to identify a pattern of a newspaper closer to 
the pro-Islamist right.  In addition, the usages of escalation and de-escalation categories 
are interpreted as depending on the ideological positioning of newspapers as well. 
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On the other hand, it should be noted that although the names of the columnists who 
wrote more about the Armenian conference in each newspaper are indicated throughout 
the analysis, it should also be noted that the columnists are not identical in terms of their 
readers.  Some columnists do take more attention by their readers in each newspaper and 
therefore those columnists’ rhetoric become more important because they have more 
power to influence the readers by their rhetoric.  However, the measurement of how much 
they are affecting their readers is not in the spectrum of this study. The last chapter of this 
study reveals the results of the literature review combined with the data analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The main aspiration of this study was to find out whether newspapers, depending on 
their ideological positioning in Turkey’s political space, have different patterns of 
escalation-oriented rhetoric or de-escalation oriented rhetoric in the conflict escalation 
over convening a conference entitled ‘Ottoman Armenians During the Decline of the 
Empire: Issues of Scientific Responsibility and Democracy.’  Arguing that media have the 
ability to be a third party, often they do not directly contribute to conflicts as a third party.  
As mentioned in the second chapter, sometimes media can play the role of an interested 
secondary party with its ideological practices when a conflict is related to the audience 
that is addressed by the medium.  Similarly, in this study the media are defined as 
interested secondary parties to the conflict over the Armenian conference.  Therefore, the 
greater importance is given to the variation of a medium’s rhetoric depending on its 
ideological practices.  Also, it is noted that the importance of timing of the media 
intervention in a conflict escalation provided a basis to evaluate the level of influence of 
media intervention conflict.  
 
From the general findings of the content analysis it can be concluded that according 
to their ideological positions, newspapers have various patterns of escalation and de-
escalation rhetoric in the conflict escalation in September and May 2005 over convening a 
conference entitled “Ottoman Armenians During the Decline of the Empire: Issues of 
Scientific Responsibility and Democracy.”  Moreover, the newspapers that are closer to 
the ends of the second dimension, which indicates the controversy between nationalist 
right and groups favoring the rise of a different ethnic identity, have a more escalation-
oriented rhetoric.   Thus, the highest intensity of escalation-oriented rhetoric can be found 
at the nationalist right end of the second dimension.  On the other hand, newspapers that 
are closer to the center on the second dimension apply a lesser amount of escalation-
oriented rhetoric than those closer to the ends of the dimension.  However, the 
insignificant results obtained from Vakit newspaper suggest that the pro-Islamist end of  
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the first dimension is not as important as the second dimension of the estimated map for 
the Armenian conference conflict.  In this sense, conflict escalation about the Armenian 
conference appears more at the crossroads of the power relationship between EU 
supporters and the nationalist right in Turkey, but is not under much influence from the 
pro-Islamist discussion. Yet, at the secularist end of the first dimension, Cumhuriyet 
proves that being a medium that is neither an extreme nationalist nor center-right results in 
using a more de-escalation oriented rhetoric. So, attempts to keep the balance of the 
discussions when there is not a direct interest it is easier for a medium to use de-
escalation-oriented rhetoric. Yet, in another conflict escalation subject, the results of a 
such a content analysis will be different because as Wolsfeld claims “editors and reporters 
all come with certain predispositions and expectations that clearly influence the way they 
process information, but their reactions are also affected by the nature of information they 
confront” (1997: 35).  
 
Lastly, the usage of escalation and de-escalation categories are interpreted as 
depending on the  ideological positioning of newspapers.  Agos was the only newspaper 
which was apparently on the side of pro-conference parties, as the weekly newspaper 
targeting the Armenian society Turkey.  Since the issue of the conflict was convening the 
Armenian conference, Agos defended the pro-conference parties by idealizing the 
objectives and protected the goals of the organizers.  However, the other four newspapers 
used E9 - condemnation of the opponent’s actions - in order to blame the anti-conference 
parties. While the other four newspapers stressed category E9 - condemnation of the 
opponent’s actions - more often,  Agos’ usage of E6 - idealization of one group’s own 
goals and objectives -  is prominent to prove the strong link between the ideological 
position and the rhetorical patterns.   
 
Therefore, this study emphasizes that different conflict escalation periods might 
develop different patterns of newspaper rhetoric, but for a unique conflict escalation 
period the ideological position of newspaper in a related political context is a crucial 
factor that can influence the course of conflict escalation.  Since being one of the major 
sources of communication and information, the media intervenes in conflict processes by 
offering cognitive frameworks using various types of rhetoric the course of conflict  
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escalation can be influenced by the rhetorical patterns developed through the ideological 
difference of the medium.  
 
The findings of the theoretical evaluation of the role of media and the content 
analysis demonstrate major implications of this study for conflict analysis in general.  In 
addition, this thesis questioned the role of media rhetoric in conflict escalation in 
particular. 
 
First of all, the inherent dynamics of communication are elaborated.  Then, it is 
argued that media are influenced by the inherent problems of communication processes. 
The point of reference leading this study is that good communication is not a guarantee for 
a conflict to be resolved, but poor communication most possibly increases the likelihood 
of the continuation of conflict or worsening of the conflict situation (Krauss and Morsella, 
cf. Deutsch and Coleman eds., 2000).  Thus, media as the channels that have power to 
collectively inform and influence the societies by transferring messages including various 
assessments of conflict situations are questioned. It is found that the main role media carry 
out in a conflict situation is intervention.  Additionally, media in Turkey elaborated the 
conflict process about the Armenian conference presumed to be interested secondary 
parties because journalists often take sides during the interpretation of the conflict 
situation. 
 
Secondly, the media’s cognitive frames offered by columnists are often used to 
rationalize receiver’s existent perception and the data sent by the media used to be fit in 
the existing variety of information that the receiver already has about the conflict 
situation.  Therefore, the media has an influence to strengthen adversaries and public’s 
cognition of conflict by using different frames developed by certain ideological 
preferences.  In sum, the result of media intervention, although sometimes might not be 
self consciously done by the journalists, is an alteration in conflict.  Therefore, selecting to 
establish a conciliatory rhetoric to wage the conflict situation constructively depends on 
medium’s ideological practices and versions of language chosen to be used.  
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The intervention of media in conflict escalation stage is more apparent and since the 
nature of conflict escalation as a stage is subject to be easily triggered or perpetuated by 
the social psychological processes.  On the other hand, media are inclined to report news 
about conflict more than before when there is an escalation in the intensity of a conflict 
because when a conflict erupts, the public pays more attention to the media; media sell 
more news; and gain more profit.  Therefore, the members of media may not be aware of 
their own cognitive frameworks, however, they actually transfer the pattern of their own 
interpretation in parallel with the ideological preferences of the medium they belong to. 
This can further escalate the conflict easily because adversaries are subject to selective 
perception, entrapment, justifications, threat, emotions and psychological changes when 
conflict erupts.  However, the ideological preferences of different mediums in Turkey are 
not criticized by this study because even though a medium has a certain ideological 
position, media can use de-escalation-oriented rhetoric when interpreting a conflict to 
prevent a further escalation in the course of conflict.  While, Frederick (1993) believes it 
is the responsibility of media to “play a positive role in education and enlightening the 
public toward peace” (cf.Gilboa, 2002:239), I believe the responsibility of media is to 
eliminate the escalation-oriented rhetoric by questioning the conflict process rather than 
judging it by its own rhetorical frameworks.  Similar to this point of view, Melone, Terzis 
and Beleli argues that although often media run for profit, and even conflict sells better 
than cooperation, journalists should ensure balanced reporting with an approach to prevent 
the escalation of tensions (2002).   However, this approach can only be developed through 
an understanding and application of quality journalism.  Moreover, for the existence of 
such a quality in journalism is linked to some factors in the political context.  As Reljic 
emphasizes, political context, economic conditions, quality journalism and public attitude 
are inter-related.  Therefore, while analyzing the approach of media in conflict escalation, 
other elements also needs attention.  
 
In sum, rhetorical patterns can exist in any suggestion that is linked to an ideological 
position.  It is argued that media’s rhetorical patterns influence by shaping the cognitive 
frameworks; thus influence psychological changes of the adversaries as well as the other 
members of the community.  Thus, it is prominently suggested in this study that using an  
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escalation-oriented or de-escalation-oriented rhetoric is important when the media 
interpret a conflict escalation process.   
 
However, by content analysis five newspapers in Turkey are questioned by their 
rhetorical patterns but it is found that the attention paid by the newspapers to the conflict 
over the Armenian conference was considerably low.  Although often the media use an 
escalation-oriented rhetoric and there is a strong link identified between the rhetoric and 
the ideological position, the low frequencies indicate that the influence of media is not as 
crucial as it was argued.    
 
In conclusion, this study is an attempt to analyze the role of media in conflict 
escalation.  Although, it is not found out that the media is highly influencing the course of 
conflict, it is still questionable for other studies because the generalizibility of this study is 
weak because only one conflict issue is analyzed in two time periods.  Also, the level of 
escalation in the Armenian conference conflict might not be intense enough to take the 
attention of media.  This means, for further research higher levels of escalation in more 
than two periods can be analyzed to scrutinize the influence of media’s rhetorical patterns 
over a course of conflict.   
 
Lastly, the policy makers in Turkey should pay more attention to the role of media 
in conflict and should attempt to develop quality journalism, which requires more neutral 
interpretations of socio-political dynamics that can be achieved through improving the 
elements of the political environment, economic conditions and developing an appropriate 
public attitude.  As a first step for such a future project, the role of analysis to understand 
the roots of the problems should constantly be on the agenda of policy makers.  
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APPENDIX 
THE ORIGINAL CODING FRAME OF KEMPF, REIMANN AND 
LUOSTARINEN (1996) (Taken from Conflict and Communication Online 
www.regener-online.de) 
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